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I   S U M M A R Y 
 
By using a case study approach this thesis wishes to study the interactions of a foreign 
company with a developing system of innovation and the possible affects on the technical 
capabilities in this system. 
This research question springs out of combining two strands of theory, namely the 
National Systems of Innovation approach and the technology gap approach to technological 
and economic development. Both these approaches focus on the importance of learning in 
order to maintain growth (in the system approach to increase innovativeness, in the gap 
approach to technologically catch up with developed countries). Combining these two strands 
lead to one main assumption in this thesis: Foreign companies (being results of foreign direct 
investments) will often hold a central position in the innovation system of a developing 
country. Due to the links with the global company and the naturally higher resources for 
knowledge creation (in the conglomerate as aggregate) such companies are more likely than 
not to obtain favourable knowledge position compared to their surroundings. It is thus 
important to see how such companies interact with the domestic surroundings. Foreign direct 
investments do of course present financial gains to the host country, but more important is the 
potential for knowledge spillovers which in turn may increase the technological capabilities 
of the domestic system of innovation. 
The empirical findings in this paper suggest that this particular company has 
virtually no direct connections with the Turkish system of innovation. There was no 
cooperation with either competitors or knowledge producers in order to improve product and 
technology development. There is little knowledge spillovers resulting from company 
employees’ changing of jobs. No consolatory services are offered to Turkish universities, and 
the main proportion of further education is performed abroad. The company employs no 
 Turkish suppliers, and the linkage to its customers is mostly done on a financial reporting and 
paying basis. The analysis of this paper thus concludes that the company due to its size is a 
rather central actor in the Turkish economy, but due to its network linkages a rather weak 
actor in the Turkish system of innovation. 
The discussion part of this thesis discusses potential policy measures that could 
amend the weaknesses discovered in the analysis. The measures are grouped in enabling and 
motivating measures; but without giving a full answer to what group fits most closely to the 
researched company. 
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C H A P T E R   1 
I N T R O D U C T I O N 
 
1.1 Purpose of the Study 
 
The justification for this thesis is a combination of two strands of theory. Firstly, the National 
Systems of Innovation approach states that innovation is a major force behind economic 
growth, that innovation occurs as a result of the interplay of several different actors, and that 
(interactive) learning is a prerequisite for innovation. Secondly, development studies concern, 
among other things, the impact of the presence of foreign companies (foreign direct 
investment) on a host country’s development and introduces the gap in technological 
capabilities as an explanation for diverging rates of development. Both strands of theory 
include considerations on how government policies can influence the rate and direction of 
technological and economic growth. 
Consequently this thesis studies the Turkish subsidiary of a foreign company. 
Interviews with company representatives explore how the company relate to other agents 
such as customers, suppliers, national universities, and domestic competitors. The purpose of 
these investigations (and the theoretical foundations laid out) is to analyse the effects this 
foreign company has on the Turkish system of innovation. I seek to discuss to what extent 
and in what quality national technical capabilities are affected by the company’s interaction 
with its surroundings. 
 
 
 
 
2 
1.2 Limitations of the Study 
 
Firstly, the discussions in this thesis are implicitly based on the assumption that a developing 
country should strive for economic growth, and that innovation is the main driver behind this 
growth. Even though it is not discussed further in the remainder of this paper, I wish to 
emphasize that economic growth is not a sufficient precondition for development (Johnson & 
Lundvall, 2003). Economic growth is part of the “development process”1, but only part2. 
Secondly, the thesis is built around the National Systems of Innovation theoretical 
framework. This approach was originally developed as a consequence of studies of 
predominantly developed countries. It is thus not necessarily correct to assume it to be a 
viable approach when studying a developing country (Katz, 1993; Arocena & Sutz, 1999). 
However, recent literature focuses on the need for diversified development strategies, 
depending on national particularities (e.g. Lall, 1998; UNCTAD, 2003); particularities that 
very well might be connected to the theoretical constructs of the National Systems of 
Innovation approach. I thus find no need to disagree with Shulin Gu who states that the 
system approach to innovation studies may in fact be even more viable and important for 
studies of developing countries, even though it should involve some methodological 
amendments (Gu, 1999). 
Thirdly, the level of analysis was chosen to be the company. This is not the most 
usual level of study in the national system of innovation approach (which often focuses on 
the macro level). I have chosen this level in accordance with for instance CIRCLE at Lund 
University who states that the firm is a very central learning agent in the system of innovation 
                                                 
1 Using the term “development process” presents pitfalls of its own. See (Göle, 2000). 
2 For instance, the World Bank uses 50 development indicators, of which eleven are related to economic growth 
(central government debt, commercial service exports, current revenue, exports of goods and services, foreign 
direct investment, gross domestic product, gross net income, GNI/capita, inflation consumer prices, 
manufactures exports, and market capitalization of listed companies). Others include education level (ten 
indicators) and employment structure (twelve indicators). Source: 
http://publications.worldbank.org/subscriptions/WDI/ 
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(CIRCLE, 2004) and Shulin Gu that emphasizes the need to study the sub-components in 
order to really understand a complex system (Gu, 1999). 
Finally, the scale and scope of this thesis is such that a full discussion of possible 
implications of the empirical findings is not viable. I will briefly mention some possible 
policy actions, but I will refrain from giving more tangible recommendations as this would be 
both overly ambitious and very superfluous. 
 
1.3 Structure of the Study 
 
This document consists of three main parts; one theoretical, one descriptive, and one 
normative. Chapter 2 (“Theoretical Foundations”) deals with the theoretical constructs this 
thesis is built on and motivated by; namely the national system of innovation and technology 
gap approaches to technological and economic growth. The first has a focus on interactions 
within a given system, often a nation, while the latter focuses on the importance of 
international cooperation (in order to enable the technological catching-up of developing 
countries). However, these two theoretical constructs build on common assumptions and 
chapter 2.7 tries to unite them into one theoretical basis. 
Chapter 3 gives a brief presentation of the Turkish system of innovation, in order to 
contextualize the forthcoming discussions and analysis. Chapter 4 introduces the company 
that was chosen as the case study and presents the information on network interactions that 
was obtained from the interviews (and it thus constitutes the descriptive part of the thesis). 
Chapters 5 and 6 make out the normative part of the study. Chapter 5 discusses the findings 
presented in chapter 4 and draws some conclusions on what affect the company’s network 
conduct may have on the development of Turkey’s domestic technical capabilities (and 
implicitly the ability to catch-up technologically). Chapter 6 concludes the paper and draws 
4 
up some possible policy implications of this study’s findings and analysis and suggests some 
areas for future research interest. 
  5 
 
C H A P T E R   2    
T H E O R E T I C A L   F O U N D A T I O N S 
 
This chapter introduces the theoretical material studied as background for this thesis. The 
constructs presented here will develop the basis for forthcoming discussions and analysis. 
Chapter 2.1 introduces the concept of a national system of innovation, while chapters 2.2, 2.3, 
and 2.4 discuss two of the most important components of such a system, namely network 
structures and interactive learning. Chapter 2.5 introduces the second main strand of theory 
this thesis rests on; the technology gap approach to economic and technological development. 
Chapter 2.5.1 takes a closer look on foreign direct investments; a mode of technologically 
catching up that, in addition to being very relevant for this thesis due to the chosen case 
company, is viewed as being particularly important to developing countries. Chapter 2.6 
describes some policy implications and justifications, with a particular focus on policies for 
network formation, learning, and foreign direct investments. Chapter 2.7 unites the two 
theoretical constructs to create an analytic foundation for later discussions, and chapter 2.8 
deals with the methodological issues behind this study. 
 
6 
2.1 Defining a National System of Innovation 
 
The National System of Innovation (henceforth NSI) approach is among concepts that have 
emerged as critic reactions to four pillars in classical economics thinking (evolutionary 
economics and neuro economics3 being other examples). Firstly, the classical line focuses on 
the single profit maximising company. Secondly, technology and knowledge are seen as a 
publicly available exogenous variable. Thirdly, economic agents act on rationality alone and 
based on perfect information. And finally, the relationship between science, technology and 
market is seen as strictly linear and causal (as depicted in the linear model of innovation 
shown in Figure 1.1). Empirical evidence on innovation clearly contradicts these views, with 
abundant examples of firm collaboration, tacit knowledge elements embedded in technology, 
high failure rates in product development and launching, and interactive processes of 
innovation with extensive use of feedback and return loops.  
The term ‘national system of innovation’ was first widely introduced in modern 
time by Christopher Freeman in a description of the Japanese production system (Freeman, 
1987) (the term was used in a more narrowly published booklet by Bengt-Åke Lundvall two 
years earlier (Lundvall, 1985)). The concept has since then rapidly gained ground, with an 
extensive adoption among academicians as well as among practitioners (the OECD adopted 
the concept as early as 1991 (Edquist, 1997)). This rapid growth has, naturally, lead to an 
overwhelming number of publications and it is, consequently, impossible within the scale and 
scope of this paper to give a full account of the development4. 
 
                                                 
3 Neuro economics challenges classic economics on the level of individual behaviour, studying behaviour 
classic economics would deem as irrational economical behaviour in particular. The research led to Daniel 
Kahneman and Vernon L. Smith receiving the Nobel Price in Economy in 2002. Source: The Nobel Foundation, 
http://www.nobel.se. 
4 Interested readers are referred to (Edquist, 1997) and (Lundvall et al, 2002). 
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Although it would be appropriate to provide an exact definition of an NSI, this 
proves as hard as one could expect. Numerous attempts have been made, starting with 
Freeman’s “The network of institutions in the public- and private-sectors whose activities and 
interactions initiate, import, modify and diffuse new technologies” (Freeman, 1987, p. 1). 
Lundvall defines it as “The elements and relationships which interact in the production, 
diffusion and use of new, and economically useful knowledge […] and are either located 
within or rooted inside the borders of a nation state”5 (Niosi, 2002, p. 292). I will try to 
summarize these definitions by discussing the three terms ‘national’, ‘system’, and 
‘innovation’ individually.  
Lundvall’s definition uses “[…] the borders of a nation state” to limit the system of 
interest, in accordance with the empirical findings of Nelson and Rosenberg (1993) and Patel 
and Pavitt (1994). Other theorists suggests that ‘regional systems of innovation’ (Maskell & 
Malmberg, 1999; Cooke & Shcienstock, 2000), ‘technological systems’ (Carlsson & 
Jacobsson, 1997), or ‘sectoral systems of innovation’ (Breschi & Malerba, 1997) would be 
more fitting limits. These suggestions should however be viewed as complementary rather 
than opposing approaches; practitioners will most likely have to consider a number of levels 
of innovation systems. Central contributors to the field of NSI such as Bengt-Åke Lundvall, 
Björn Johnson, Esben Sloth Andersen, Bent Dalum (Lundvall, 1992; Lundvall et al, 2002), 
and Charles Edquist (1997) all emphasize the need for a flexible and pragmatic definition of 
the limits of the system. Rather than agreeing upon one single definition, a given study 
should include in and limit the concept in accordance with the interest of that study. This 
paper intends to study network interactions in a system of innovation and the consequences 
for technological capabilities and innovation policies in a developing country. Hence, using 
                                                 
5 Other suggestions include Nelson and Rosenberg (1993), Edquist and Lundvall (1993), Niosi and colleagues 
(1993), Patel and Pavitt (1994), Metcalfe (1995), and Edquist (2003). 
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the national borders of Turkey as a spatial limit for the system would be the most fitting 
choice. 
Using the term ‘system’ indicates that the concept of an NSI assumes a number of 
components. Among the components included in the various definitions are institutions 
(Freeman, 1987; Nelson & Rosenberg, 1993), elements and relationships (Lundvall, 2002), 
and formal institutions and organisations (Niosi, 2002). The pragmatic approach is truly 
being followed, and it seems that definitions have been made in accordance with the purpose 
of the study in question. Synthesising the various definitions, it seems plausible to borrow 
terms from a chemical reaction in order to describe the components of the innovation system. 
A definition would thus include agents, interactions, catalysts and outcomes. Firstly, agents 
include profit and non-profit, governmental and private, and individual and organisational 
entities (e.g. firms, universities and non-governmental interest organisations). Secondly, 
interactions imply the flow of financial and non-financial resources, tacit and codified 
knowledge, quantitative and qualitative information, and policies between the agents. 
Thirdly, catalysts are the culturally dependent “set of habits, routines, rules, norms and laws, 
which regulate the relations between people, and shape social interaction” (Johnson, 1992, p. 
26)6. Finally, the possible outcomes would encompass individual and organisational learning, 
technological and organisational innovation, and the acceptance and diffusion of these 
innovations. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6 The use of ’catalyst’ may be a little misleading, as institutions in a national system of innovation may both 
facilitate and prohibit change to occur (cf. Bower & Christensen, 1995; Edquist, 1997; Sull, 1999). 
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‘Innovation’ points to the purpose of the concept: describing processes of 
innovation. If the definitions of NSI are numerous, it pales in comparison with the number of 
definitions of innovation7. Faced with this dazzling multiplicity, I choose to follow the 
originator of the term, Joseph Schumpeter, and say that an innovation is (Schumpeter, 1939, 
pp. 87-8) 
 
[…] The setting up of a new production function. This covers the case of a 
new commodity as well as those of a new form of organisation such as a 
merger, of the opening up of new markets, and so on […] innovation 
combines factors in a new way, or that it consists in the carrying out of New 
Combinations. 
 
This definition encompasses product (“a new commodity”) and organisational (“a new form 
of organisation”) innovations8.  
 
2.2 Network Interaction Arrangements 
 
As mentioned earlier, the NSI approach was conceived as a more sophisticated alternative to 
the view on innovation processes in classical economic thinking. The concept of a firm 
innovating in isolation and the causal model of the relationship between science, technology 
and market were among the thoughts criticized. The simplicity (innovation is just a change in 
the input/output ratio, and the more money in science, the more products available in the 
market place) of these two models are of course appealing, as it enables the analysis of 
technological development strictly in terms of financial models. 
                                                 
7 E.g. Ansoff (1957), Mintzberg (1979), Souder (1983), Page (1991), Lundvall (1992), Cooper (1993), and 
Nelson and Rosenberg (1993). 
8 Some critic has been directed towards Schumpeter’s definition, saying that it doesn’t include the diffusion of 
the innovation. I choose to use his definition despite this critic, as empirical findings have shown that a new 
product may have learning effects without being adopted on a large scale; in fact the lack of adoption might be 
what facilitates learning from the innovation (Kogut & Kulatilaka, 1994; McGrath, 1999). 
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The linear model of innovation is depicted in Figure 2.1. Basic research discovers 
scientific facts, which in turn are applied in applied research to solve a given problem. Based 
on applied research, a product is developed and produced, and finally sold to the user society. 
No returns to prior development stages are allowed, and each stage functions as a single 
source input/output transforming function. This is clearly a much too simplistic and 
technologically deterministic view on how innovation processes work in reality. Such strict 
causality rarely takes place in real life, and the chain-linked model of innovation developed 
by Kline and Rosenberg (1986) is accepted as a more realistic view on how innovation 
processes may occur. 
 
 
 
 
In the chain-linked model, innovation might be initiated by the market (potential market) as 
well as motivated by technology (analytic design), and it thus allows for both push and pull 
innovations. The process is allowed to start in a number of phases, as well as being able to 
retrace its step and revisit former phases (thus eliminating the strong causality in the linear 
model). The role of research and scientific knowledge is radically different from the linear 
model, depicting three possible routes for the development of an innovation. 
 
  Basic research 
 
           Applied research 
 
     Development            Production 
 
           Sales            User society 
Figure 2.1: The Linear Model of Innovation (Adapted from Bush, 1945) 
Potential 
market 
Invent/
produce 
analytic 
design 
Detailed 
design and 
test 
Redesign 
and 
produce 
Distribute 
and market 
Knowledge 
Research 
Figure 2.2: The Chain-Linked Model of Innovation (Kline & Rosenberg, 1986) 
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• The innovation might be based on existing knowledge, with no need for research 
being performed. 
• A search in the base of knowledge might reveal that research is necessary before 
resuming development. 
• Research might be initiated without conferring the knowledge base. 
 
As well as being a more viable alternative to the linear model of innovation, the chain-linked 
model also shows the interactive nature of innovation; a nature that has been stressed in a 
number of additional publications9. However, there is no unanimous agreement in the 
literature on what form these interactions may take. The origin of the term was a study of 
user-producer interaction (Lundvall, 1985)10, implying that using a chained user-producer 
approach would be viable (a user served by multiple producers and in turn being a producer 
to multiple users). Another plausible approach would be using theories on strategic alliances 
between complementary firms where companies interact based on a scarcity of crucial 
resources (Jarillo, 1988; Teece, 1988; Chesbrough & Teece, 2002). A third approach would 
be using Michael Porter’s (1985) model of competitive forces, which include five generic 
classes of possible interaction agents (Figure 2.3), as the starting ground. Fourthly, it would 
be possible to use the chain-linked model of innovation, which inherently allows firm-
government, and firm-market interaction. All the models mentioned allows for innovation 
and product development to be seen as a process influenced by a number of sources. 
 
                                                 
9 E.g. Teece (1988), von Hippel (1988), Lundvall and colleagues (2002), Edquist (2003), and Niosi (2003). 
10 This relationship has also been stressed by other publications, for instance Jorde and Teece (1998), Lundvall 
(1999), Edquist and colleagues (2000), and Gadde and Håkansson (2001). 
12 
 
 
However, none of the approaches subsumes all strong aspects of the others and none of them 
can be used in isolation. The chained user-producer approach and the chain-linked model of 
innovation do not explicitly include horizontal cooperation between competing firms. 
Strategic alliances and the competitive forces do not explicitly include cooperation between 
knowledge producing non-profit organisations and firms. 
In their report on seven research projects in the Targeted Socio-Economic Research 
Programme (henceforth TSER) of the European Union, Bengt-Åke Lundvall and Susan 
Borrås state that interaction might take the form of horizontal cooperation or vertical linkage. 
Horizontal cooperation between competing firms or between firms and research centres is 
mainly done for R&D purposes, while vertical linkages between users and producers are 
mainly used as a means of improving process and product innovation capabilities (Lundvall 
& Borrås, 1997). This approach unites all the four previously mentioned models of 
interaction, and I will group the following discussion according to it. 
 
Competitors 
Future competitors 
Suppliers Buyers 
Substitutes 
Figure 2.3: Porter’s Five Forces of Competition (Porter, 1985)
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2.2.1 Horizontal Cooperation 
 
Horizontal cooperation can be seen in Figure 2.2 as the interaction with research and 
knowledge, as well as in the ‘future competitors–competitors–substitutes’ axis in Figure 2.3. 
In accordance with Lundvall and Borrås’s understanding of the concept, this suggests two 
generic forms of horizontal cooperation arrangements. The existence and importance of 
collaboration have been thoroughly established in the literature11.  
 
2.2.1.1 Horizontal Firm-Firm Cooperation 
 
Horizontal firm-firm cooperation most commonly takes place in the research and/or 
development phase of new products or technologies, while the commercialization of the 
results is left to the individual venture partners (Mowery & Rosenberg, 1989; Lundvall & 
Borrås, 1997). The rationale for such cooperation arrangements can be found in three 
trademarks of modern industries. Firstly, new products are increasingly multi-disciplinary 
(e.g. the merger of communication and information technologies). The fact that successful 
product development in a number of industries necessarily have to involve knowledge about 
a number of basic sciences, applied technologies, and market and organisations renders it 
virtually impossible for companies to undertake complex product development on their 
own12. Secondly, product development in a number of industries is so financially demanding 
that single companies don’t want to undertake the capital risks themselves (Lundvall & 
Borrås, 1997). Thirdly, joint research efforts with other companies (as well as with 
                                                 
11 See Cohen and Levinthal (1990), Cooke and Schienstock (1996), Lundvall (1999), or Edquist and colleagues 
(2000) for the firm-firm linkage. Edquist (1997), Jorde and Teece (1998), Sivadas and Dwyer (2000), Lundvall 
and colleagues (2002), and Niosi (2003) deal with the firm-knowledge producer linkages. 
12 See Lundvall (1999), Sivadas and Dwyer (2000), or Niosi (2003). Considering these propositions however, 
the findings of Link (1987) that joint research ventures is most common in industries involving mature 
technologies are quite surprising. 
14 
universities and research centres), are a means of expanding the presumably narrow 
technology base of individual firms, thus reducing the risk of technological lock-in (Lundvall 
et al, 2002). Cohen and Levinthal (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990) mentions that ‘collaboration’ 
also might take the form of interaction of the firm’s absorptive capacity with competitor’s 
involuntary knowledge spillovers. I will return to the concept of absorptive capacity when 
discussing learning mechanisms in an NSI. 
 
2.2.1.2 Horizontal Firm-Knowledge Producer Cooperation 
 
Universities and public research centres are expected to fill two functions crucial to economic 
growth and innovative capabilities. Firstly, they (especially universities) have a role in 
building general scientific and technological capabilities. This is specifically done by 
teaching students problem solving methods well suited for the complex situations faced in 
real life (Lundvall & Borrås, 1997). Secondly, as more and more technological developments 
rely on scientific advances, these public institutions should work as providers of more or less 
targeted basic research results (Cohen & Levin, 1989; Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Lundvall & 
Borrås, 1997). Additionally, as firms usually follow established trajectories in order to 
achieve increasing returns state funded research should work as a means of challenging these 
established technological paths (Callon, 1993). This could be done in direct collaboration 
with firms, for instance through technoparks or university-located incubators, or merely 
filling the ‘provider’ function. 
 
  15 
2.2.2 Vertical Linkages 
 
As seen from the model in Figure 2.3, vertical (although horizontal in the model) linkages 
may be made upstream to buyers and users, as well as downstream to suppliers. The 
interaction with customers is also reflected in the chain-linked model in Figure 2.2, while 
supplier relationships are emphasized in theories on complementary assets and strategic 
alliances. 
 
2.2.2.1 Vertical Customer Linkage13 
 
A number of authors emphasize the importance of feedback from user markets as a means of 
developing innovative capabilities. These publications point to the customer as an important 
source of ideas for new products and suggest that close connections with users are necessary 
in order to embed customer reactions in subsequent incremental improvements of the 
launched product14. Lundvall (1987), in more detail, lists five important reasons for having 
relationships with company customers. Firstly, process innovations at the user level may 
represent a future threat. Secondly, product innovations other than the company’s own 
developments may create a demand for new or improved complementary assets. Thirdly, 
context-dependent use of a product may lead to demand for improvements not projected in 
the initial development. Fourthly, problems or technological interdependencies may represent 
a possibility for new and/or interface products. And, fifthly, the competence level and 
learning rate of user communities will have an impact on the timing of future product 
releases. Government is a customer that deserves special attention. I will return to the aspect 
                                                 
13 Depending on the company and industry in question, three categories may be identified; intermediate users 
(assemblers), distributors, and end users. The discussion is viable for all three groups. 
14 See von Hippel (1988), Jorde and Teece (1998), Lundvall (1999), Dodgson (2000), or Edquist and colleagues 
(2000). 
16 
of government procurement (the government acting as a demanding customer) in the section 
on policies. 
Maintaining close customer contacts is, however, not without its obvious pitfalls. 
Donald Sull (1999) and Joseph Bower and Clayton Christensen (1995) show how an overly 
strong focus on the needs of current customers may lead to neglecting the importance of 
emerging technologies with initially inferior performance; in other words, being subject to a 
technological lock-in. This ‘Dynamics of Failure’ has led to the downfall of a surprisingly 
high number of incumbent firms faced with radical, as well as incremental innovations. 
 
2.2.2.2 Vertical Supplier Linkage 
 
The degree of vertically linking to suppliers has historically varied from the extreme vertical 
integration performed by Henry Ford, who bought forests to secure the supply of wood to his 
factories, to the emergence of online ‘virtual companies’ in recent years (Chesbrough & 
Teece, 2002).  In the midway of these extremes, we find the traditional buyer-supplier 
relationship. Such relationships are established for two main reasons; firstly, an innovation is 
part of a system, and thus reliant on complementary assets for it to be profitable (Teece, 
1988; Callon, 1993). Secondly, the fordistic extreme of vertically integrating into all these 
complementary assets would be unnecessarily costly and lead to organisational rigidity15 
(Teece, 1988; Lundvall & Borrås, 1997; Dodgson, 2000).  
                                                 
15 According to David Teece (1988), the nature of the relationship will be dependent on the nature of the assets 
involved. Complementary assets may be generic, specialized or co-specialized. Generic assets are assumed to be 
in abundant supply where a choice among several possible suppliers is possible, and the relationship power is 
asymmetrically distributed favouring the buyer’s side (an example being production facilities for clothing). 
Specialized assets tilts the relationship power to the supplier side, as the innovation relies on these assets being 
provided from a low number of suppliers (an example being distribution channels). Co-specialized assets 
distribute the relationship power symmetrically, as there is a bi-lateral dependence between the innovation and 
the complementary asset (an example being shock absorbers produced for a certain car model). Although these 
examples above are all of a technological nature, I wish to emphasize that providers of more ‘soft’ forms of 
resources (e.g. consulting agencies, advertising agencies, and marketing research institutes) also are included in 
the term ‘suppliers’. 
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The importance of supplier relationships can be seen both in pull (buyer requesting) 
and push (supplier offering) relationships. Pull situations may arise where producers face new 
market demands or policy restrictions (especially in terms of environmental regulations) and 
consequently need new or improved functionality from technological sub-components. 
Relationships with providers of ‘soft’ resources will most often be of a pull nature, where the 
buyer requests information about or analysis of a particular field of interest (Lundvall, 1987). 
The push relationships are more complex and sometimes quite troubling. A number 
of studies have shown that innovation in a supplier’s product may induce innovation at the 
buyer’s side16. This opening up of new design spaces is also recognized in theories of 
evolutionary economic growth (Perez, 1983; Freeman & Louçã 2001). However, as discussed 
by Rebecca Henderson and Kim Clark (1990), even a small incremental change in a 
product’s component may lead to a reconfiguration of an established system to link together 
existing components in a new way (e.g. Just-in-Time production systems or Total Quality 
Management17). This phenomenon, which they label architectural innovation, has proven 
devastating for a number of incumbent companies. Close connections with suppliers are 
therefore important, not only for being aware of new design spaces, but also for architectural 
knowledge about the ways in which the components are integrated and linked together into a 
coherent whole (Henderson & Clark, 1990). 
The discussion on network arrangements is summarized in Table 2.1. 
 
 
 
                                                 
16 See Jorde and Teece (1998), Edquist and Hommen (1999), Dodgson (2000), and Gadde and Håkansson 
(2001). 
17 Just-in-Time production will for instance require completely new interactions between logistic and productive 
functions in the company, as the primary goal of the production philosophy is to eliminate unnecessary stocks. 
Total Quality Management will require new interaction modes between departments, as quality controls is 
supposed to be performed in every part of the production chain. 
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Table 2.1: Actors in a National System of Innovation 
Linkage Agent Arrangements 
Horizontal Competitor Partner for joint research ventures 
Voluntary and involuntary knowledge spillovers 
 Universities and research 
centre 
Provider of work force with problem solving capabilities 
Provider of basic scientific knowledge 
Vertical Customer Source of product development ideas 
Indications of emerging markets 
 Supplier Fulfilling of buyer requests 
Enabling new design spaces 
 
 
2.3 The Emergence and Sustainability of Networks 
 
I have mentioned earlier in this paper that the NSI approach emerged as a reaction to classical 
economic thinking. The validity of the criticism is clearly evident when discussing how 
industry networks emerge and how they are sustained. Seeing network interactions in the 
light of classical game theory provides the first example. ‘The Prisoner’s Dilemma’ is a 
classical game theory problem which, translated to network cooperation, is modelled with 
two agents. If both choose to cooperate both receive a reward. This reward is higher than 
what would be received if both choose not to cooperate, but less than a non-cooperating agent 
would get if the other chooses to cooperate. The least reward is received by a co-operator 
with a non-cooperating partner. In this quite realistic set-up, a perfectly rational agent would 
choose not to co-operate in any case18. If we translate this to an actual joint innovation 
venture, every rational partner would send their worst people, hoping that the others would 
send their best. But, as all actors act rationally, they all send their worst, and the risk of the 
venture failing would be tremendously high (Jarillo & Ricart; 1987). 
                                                 
18 Given that an agent B cooperates, A will not cooperate, as the reward for (not cooperate, cooperate) is higher 
than (cooperate, cooperate). If B does not cooperate, A will not cooperate, as the reward for (not cooperate, not 
cooperate) is higher than (cooperate, not cooperate). Hence, agent A has (not cooperate) as her dominant 
strategy, which will lead to the highest outcome regardless of agent B’s actions. 
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The second example is provided with respect to profit maximising agents. Given 
this, an innovator would always overstate the value of the innovation in order to get more 
favourable contractual conditions. On the other hand, their partner would, in the case of a 
successful innovation, always ‘run away’ with the technology (Teece, 1988; Sivadas & 
Dwyer, 2000). The third failure of classical economic thought when it comes to explaining 
networks is with respect to the notion of pure markets. In these pure markets, the only 
transmitted information is quantitative data on prices and quantities. This clearly fails to 
cover the need for qualitative information in order for innovations targeted at user needs to 
occur19. These three short examples, contrasted with the abundance of successful industrial 
relationships actually taking form, clearly show that there has to be another element involved 
when industry networks emerge and which helps to sustain them. 
One element from the classical reasoning on networks may however be kept in 
consideration. Networks emerge partly as a way of reducing financial and non-financial 
transaction costs, and are sustained partly as a means of avoiding financial and non-financial 
switching costs, which will increase with the duration of the relationship (Jarillo, 1988). The 
‘novelty’ introduced by the NSI approach is institutions guiding social conduct, where trust in 
particular is essential for sustained networks20; trust being when “one party has confidence in 
an exchange partner’s reliability and integrity” (Morgan & Hunt, 1994, p. 23). This notion is 
not entirely new though, and it may have been inspired by the works of Aldrich and Wetten 
(1981) and Emerson and Cook (1984) which focused on the importance of confidence and 
social ties in networks. 
                                                 
19 Given this assumption, producers will have no information about user needs, and users will have no 
information on the use-value of products. Successful innovation would, under such conditions, be extremely rare 
(Edquist & Hommen, 1999; Lundvall et al, 2002). 
20 Among these are Edquist (1997), Lundvall (1999), Sivadas and Dwyer (2000), Gadde and Håkansson (2001), 
and Holmen and colleagues (2003). 
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Another important social value that enables the emergence and sustainability of 
networks is shared symbolic and oral languages and explanatory schemes21. This feature, 
which beyond doubt is culturally and geographically dependent, would explain why some 
research show that the strength of networks are positively correlated with geographical co-
location (Håkansson & Wootz, 1975; Lundvall & Borrås, 1997). 
Other important features of a network are an asymmetry of power or knowledge 
(Polyani, 1958; Lundvall, 1998) and reciprocal exchange of complementary assets 
(Håkansson & Snoheta, 1995; Lundvall & Borrås, 1997; Sivadas & Dwyer, 2000). The 
probability of fruitful interactive learning occurring is high, given that the network 
relationship shows sign of trust (in order to believe the involved information), involves a 
shared language (in order to communicate properly and on shared grounds), has an 
asymmetry of power or knowledge (in order to create a master-apprentice relationship), and 
reciprocal exchange (in order to avoid freeloading members who would undermine the trust). 
 
2.4 Interactive Learning 
 
This far it has been established that the NSI approach views interactions as essential to 
agents’ learning of innovative capabilities. Consequently, this part of the paper will focus on 
mechanisms of interactive learning in greater detail22. 
Arocena and Sutz (2003, pp. 309-310) coin the concept of interactive learning 
spaces, which they define as “[…] situations in which different actors are able to strengthen 
their capacities to learn while interacting in the search for the solution to a given problem”. I 
have previously discussed who these actors may be, and which interactive situations they 
                                                 
21 Cohen and Levinthal (1990) and Lundvall and Borrås (1997). 
22 This section deals exclusively with learning on an organisational level. It should however be emphasized, in 
accordance with Mahoney (1995) and Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995), that organisations learn through their 
individual members. Furthermore, learning is fairly well debated as a psychological topic, e.g. Skinner (1969) or 
Argyris (1993). 
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may mutually construct. What will be discussed here is thus the actual activity of learning. 
From Arocena and Sutz’s definition it seems proper to distinguish between two forms of 
learning; learning aimed at increasing problem solving capacity and learning aimed at 
increasing learning capacity. Edquist and Johnson (1997), in accordance, mentions the ability 
to utilize knowledge and absorption of externally created knowledge among the competencies 
required from innovative firms. Discussing the impact of primary education, Fagerberg 
(1995) states that education is associated with learning to learn and should be backed up with 
more practically guided on-the-job training. Lundvall (1998) refers to know-what, know-
why, know-how, and know-who; the three former being equivalent with Edquist and 
Johnson’s ability to utilize knowledge and the latter to the absorption of knowledge. 
This taxonomy of learning activities is well in accordance with the classical writing 
of Argyris and Schön (1978) who, studying organisational learning, found learning to be 
either single or double looped. Single looped learning involves obtaining and creating 
knowledge in order to solve specific problems within the current belief paradigm. Double 
looped learning involves upsetting current or creating new paradigms (schemata or mental 
models). Although not as frequently mentioned, Argyris and Schön also used the concept of 
deutero learning; increasing learning capabilities by learning. 
A separation between tacit and codified elements of knowledge can be deduced 
from the five examples given above23. This separation, originally made by Polyani (1966), 
also stands central in Nonaka and Takeuchi’s (1995) theory on knowledge creation in 
organisations24. They claim that innovating organisations do not simply process external 
information (outside in) in order to solve problems, but in fact also create new knowledge 
(inside out) to redefine problems and re-create their environment. This dynamic leads to the 
                                                 
23 Tacit knowledge is personal, context-specific, and therefore hard to formalize and communicate. Codified 
knowledge, on the other hand, refers to knowledge that is transmittable in formal language. 
24 This framework is particularly interesting in the context of this paper, due to (1) the theory being a result of 
studies of Japanese companies, and (2) network interactions frequently being mentioned as one of the prime 
sources of Japanese competitive advantage. 
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identification of four different learning typologies, which interact in a knowledge creating 
spiral. These are (1) socialization (tacit to tacit)25, (2) externalization (tacit to codified), (3) 
combination (codified to codified), and (4) internalization (codified to tacit). The authors 
themselves hold externalization to be the key of organisational knowledge creation; a process 
that is facilitated with the use of metaphors, analogies and models. Nonaka and Takeuchi’s 
theory is thus similar to the thoughts of the NSI approach, in that these metaphors and models 
are similar to institutions, and in the emphasis on interaction (learning mode 1 and 2) as a 
source of knowledge crucial to innovation. 
Wesley Cohen and Daniel Levinthal’s theory on the absorptive capacity of firms 
(Cohen & Levinthal, 1990) should also be mentioned in this context. Cohen and Levinthal 
agree with the path dependency notion in the NSI approach, as they define absorptive 
capacity with26  
 
We argue that the ability to evaluate and utilize outside knowledge is largely a 
function of the level of prior related knowledge […] prior related knowledge 
confers an ability to recognize the value of new information, assimilate it, and 
apply it to commercial ends. These abilities collectively constitute what we 
call a firm's ‘absorptive capacity’27. 
 
This would suggest that the common notion of knowledge spill-overs as a virtually costless 
vehicle for knowledge transfer is, to some extent, false. Knowledge spill-overs and their 
possible absorption should in this sense also be viewed as a part of the interactive learning 
complex. 
 
                                                 
25 Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995, p. 64) claim that ”[…] interactions with customers before product development 
[...] are, in fact, a never-ending process of sharing tacit knowledge and creating ideas for development”. These 
ideas must however to some extent be externalized in order to be a useful source of innovation. 
26 [article read in HTML format; accurate page numbering not available] 
27 Absorptive capacity is thus an important pro to consider research in a firm and in a nation as an investment 
rather than a cost, both in relation to own future research and to external research. 
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2.5 The Particular Case of Developing Countries: The Catching-Up Problem 
 
Although there is disagreement concerning what ‘development’ constitutes and what 
strategies are better in order to achieve it, most people will agree that some countries are less 
developed than others. This thesis concerns the case of Turkey, a country which, according to 
the frequently used definition of gross net income per capita28, is developing29. This section 
of the document will consequently treat some of the particular issues faced by developing 
countries. 
Classical economics focuses on input prices, leading to low labour costs, as the 
main focus for developing countries. ‘Getting the prices right’ will lead to the country 
increasing its income level, and thus developmental stage. However, the struggle of sub-
Saharan countries30 (which have significantly lower wage levels than the rapidly developing 
East Asian countries) clearly indicates that the picture is more complex. The technology gap 
approach offers a more feasible answer to the development divergence of the countries of the 
world. 
                                                 
28 GNI/capita is defined as “the gross national income, converted to U.S. dollars using the World Bank Atlas 
method, divided by the midyear population. GNI is the sum of value added by all resident producers plus any 
product taxes (less subsidies) not included in the valuation of output plus net receipts of primary income 
(compensation of employees and property income) from abroad.”. Source: 
http://publications.worldbank.org/subscriptions/WDI/ 
29 The World Bank classifies countries in four categories; low income (for 2003 less than 735 USD), lower 
middle income (736-2935 USD), upper middle income (2936-9075 USD), and high income (more than 9075 
USD). The three former categories are defined to be emerging economies, or developing countries. Turkey’s 
GNI/capita was in 2001 estimated to 2500 USD. Source: http://publications.worldbank.org/subscriptions/WDI/ 
30 In 2002, of the world’s 24 least developed countries (GNI/capita less than 280 USD), 21 were sub-Saharan 
(Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, 
Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, Sierra 
Leone, Tanzania, Togo and Uganda). The only exceptions were Cambodia, Nepal and Tajikistan. Source: 
http://publications.worldbank.org/subscriptions/WDI/ 
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The technology gap approach can be said to rest upon four main hypothesises, all of 
which are empirically investigated and to a satisfactory extent proven (Fagerberg, 1987): 
• A country’s economic and technological development levels are closely co-
related. 
• The rate of economic growth is positively co-related to the rate of growth in 
technological level. 
• Countries at the lower end of the gap can increase its economic growth through 
technological imitation (‘catching-up’). 
• The rate of catching-up depends on the mobilization of resources for transforming 
social, institutional and economic structures. 
 
Hypothesises one, two and four offers a theoretical connection between the technology gap 
approach and the NSI approach; there is a focus on technological growth as an important 
force of economic growth, and the scope of mechanisms behind technological growth are 
concerned to be very wide. It thus remains in this part of the document to further explore the 
concept of imitation or transfer of technology, which predominantly is seen as the initiator of 
technological progress in developing countries (Shin, 1996). 
Given the classical assumption of technology as a commodity resembling a public 
good would render discussions on the catching up process unnecessary. In this case, 
technology is freely available to everyone and catching up would merely be a matter of time. 
However, it has long been established that international technology transfer in fact is 
associated with considerable costs. The cost structure depends on the type of technology 
transferred and the mode in which it is transferred, but regarding technology to have zero 
social and economic cost is utterly false (Teece, 1977). There are numerous possibilities for 
how technology may be transferred, but the most important and comprehensive is foreign 
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direct investment (it is also the most relevant for this thesis). Other modes include contractual 
agreements (licensing and franchising), exporting and more informal modes such as 
published scientific material (Tatoglu et al, 2003). 
Foreign direct investment (henceforth FDI) comprises wholly owned subsidiaries or 
joint ventures with foreign involvement. It is thus a more stable form of capital inflows than 
portfolio investments and loans, with a longer time horizon and placing larger proportions of 
risk on the foreign investor (Dutz et al, 2003).The choice of equity from the multinational 
firm is said to rest on four considerations (Tatoglu et al, 2003): 
• Transaction cost – The ownership percentage is optimized to minimize transaction 
costs. 
• Locational and internationalization advantages – Minimizing negotiation costs, 
ensuring adequate quality control, avoiding the risk of dissipation of knowledge, 
and avoiding property right enforcement costs. 
• Bargaining power – Relative bargaining power between the multinational and the 
host government. 
• Organisational capabilities – Contributions and demands placed on capabilities in 
the host country division. 
 
Tatoglu and colleagues (2003) found that foreign ownership in Turkish manufacturing 
industry was positively co-related to very high (or very low) industry concentration, 
operational similarity with the mother company, cultural proximity, and use-intensity of 
natural resources. Traditionally, FDI inflows to African countries have rested on the size of 
the domestic market and the presence of important natural resources. Jacques Morisset 
claims, however, that African countries that employ policies to improve their business 
climate are increasingly viewed as more attractive recipient of foreign capital (Morisset, 
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2000). This clearly indicates that the level of foreign equity a country would receive largely 
depends on its perceived system of innovation. Particularly aspects two and four mentioned 
above rely on the level of capabilities in domestic firms and knowledge producers in the host 
country. I will shortly return more closely to this when discussing technological capabilities. 
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2.5.1 Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) 
 
Table 2.2: Top 25 Receivers of FDI in 
1998, million $ 
United States 
United Kingdom 
China 
Netherlands 
Brazil 
France 
Belgium/Luxembourg 
Germany 
Sweden 
Canada 
Spain 
Finland 
Mexico 
Singapore 
Thailand 
Ireland 
Denmark 
Australia 
Austria 
Argentina 
Republic of Korea 
Poland 
Chile 
Venezuela 
Malaysia 
193 375 
63 124 
45 460 
31 859 
28 718 
28 039 
20 889 
19 877 
19 358 
16 500 
11 307 
11 115 
10 238 
7 218 
6 960 
6 820 
6 623 
6 568 
5 915 
5 697 
5 143 
5 129 
4 792 
3 737 
3 727 
Global FDI amounted in 2002 to 651 billion USD31, the 
grand share flowing between developed countries (16 of 
the top 25 recipient countries are developed, see Table 2.2 
with developing countries in italics, and developing 
countries received only 29% of total investments) (AT 
Kearney, 2003; UNCTAD, 2004a). However, FDI 
accounted for the largest share of capital inflows to 
developing countries in the 1990s, and it is expected to 
increase both its relative and absolute importance further 
in coming decades (AT Kearney, 2003; UNCTAD, 
2004a). As it includes the actual establishment of a 
transnational corporation in the host country, FDI is 
frequently regarded to be the technology transfer mode 
with the strongest effects on the host country’s economic 
development. Such effects may include technology 
spillovers, human capital formation, increased 
productivity in domestic industry, and increased demand 
for products of local suppliers (in turn leading to increased (UNCTAD, 2004a) 
employment) (UNCTAD, 1994; UNCTAD 2002; Lall, 1995; McKinsey, 2002; Dutz et al, 
2003). These effects are however not automatic, and the positive importance of FDI relies 
heavily on the technological capabilities in a national system of innovation. 
                                                 
31 The total amount of FDI has been declining since its peak at USD 1.4 trillion in 2000, mostly due to global 
instability (fear of deflation, SARS, 11th of September 2001 and so on). It is, however, expected to regain its 
former strength and increase further as the global macroeconomic environment stabilizes once again (AT 
Kearney, 2003). 
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Abramowitz (1986) introduced the concept of ‘social capabilities’ to explain why 
the rate of catching-up differed between developing countries. This concept is similar to the 
absorptive capacity which I introduced earlier in this paper, and more recent literature in fact 
uses this name for the phenomena (Kim, 2001; UNCTAD, 2002). Lall (1993) specifies three 
distinct groups of technological capabilities, namely (1) investment capabilities, (2) 
production capabilities, and (3) linkage capabilities. Shin (1996), on the other hand, separates 
between technological and non-technological components of technological capabilities, as 
well as between specific and general parts. However, they both agree that technological 
capability is a path-dependent parameter which relies on previous learning and search efforts 
(much like absorptive capacity). Finally, technological capabilities might be seen as either an 
individual-, institutional- or national-level parameter, where externalities and linkages render 
the total more than the mere sum of its parts (Lall, 1993).  
In order to benefit from imported technology and inflows of FDI, a country and its 
institutions and corporations must display a certain level of technological capabilities. 
Without the necessary prior knowledge, the forward and backward linkages will be severely 
limited (Mowery & Oxley, 1995; UNCTAD, 2002; UNCTAD, 2003). This is also observed 
by Lall (1998), who states that countries with weak capabilities most frequently receive 
relatively simple technologies, while more advanced countries receive complex ones and in 
turn generate new technologies themselves. This mechanism can explain the development 
divergence, interpreting development of technological capabilities as a self-fuelling spiral. 
Maintaining the development of national technological capabilities is thus essential in order 
not to be caught in a situation where closing the technology gap approaches an 
insurmountable task32. 
                                                 
32 This also implies that, in order to achieve rapid technological development, it is important to maintain a 
certain level of social cohesion within a country (Lall, 1993; Conceição et al, 2003). 
  29 
Kvinge (2004, pp. 9-12) identifies four types of possible spillovers from the 
presence of foreign companies; 
• Type I spillovers where knowledge is assumed to spread through personal contact 
(often called the ‘contagion effect’). Sources for Type I spillovers include 
employees changing companies, cooperation projects, demonstration effects, and 
reverse engineering. 
• Type II spillovers where the economy experience an increase in social return due 
to lowered prices. 
• Type III spillovers where local firms are pushed to a higher level of achievement 
due to the foreign competition. 
• Type IV spillovers that can create virtuous circles of growth. 
 
Clearly, in the context of this thesis, type I spillovers are the most interesting as they 
encompass the development of national technological capabilities.  
Dunning and Narula (1996) developed the investment development path (henceforth 
IDP) theory; a five stage classification scheme to distinguish between the rationales and 
effects of FDI. Stage 1 attracts FDI through possession of natural assets. Stage 2 resembles 
import substitution where the domestic market is financially attractive to FDI. However, 
stages 1 and 2 presents no obvious rationale for initiating local research and development, 
and the R&D effort of a multinational will be limited to adaptation of globally produced 
technologies. The development of the country’s absorptive capacity (and type I spillovers) 
will thus be lower-than-optimal. In Stage 3 FDI is rationalized by efficiency seeking and 
some local basic R&D may be initiated due to efficiency gains for the multinational, while 
stages 4 and 5 encompass developed countries that are net investors rather than investees. 
Connecting the four types of spillovers with the IDP theory of gives Table 2.3 (Kvinge, 2004, 
30 
p. 24), which also includes the concept of absorptive capacity (technological capabilities) 
discussed earlier.  
 
Table 2.3: The IDP Path and Spillovers to the Host Economy 
Stage R&D Absorptive 
capacity 
Spillovers to the host Type I spillovers 
1 Adaptation of product and 
process 
Low Type I 
Type III 
Type IV 
Small 
2 Adaptation of product and 
process 
Medium Type I 
Type II 
Type III 
Type IV 
Growing 
3 Adaptation of product and 
process 
Basic research 
Medium Type I 
Type II 
Type III 
Maximum 
4 Basic research / technical 
sourcing 
High Type I (positive and 
negative) 
Declining  
5 Basic research / technical 
sourcing 
High Type I (positive and 
negative) 
Small 
Adapted from Kvinge (2004, p. 24) 
 
 
A presence of multinationals in a developing country through FDI might be seen as a good 
opportunity to increase domestic technological capabilities, as the multinational often act as a 
demanding customer for local suppliers33. Revisiting the discussion on network interaction 
arrangements in Chapter 2.2, we see that this is not the only benign position technologically 
advanced companies can hold. They are also potentially influential partners in technology 
development joint ventures (with companies or knowledge producers), a demanding customer 
to the educational system, and possibly an influentially enabling supplier. However, there are 
also important negative aspects regarding the conduct of multinationals in relation to FDI. 
                                                 
33 The domestic presence of advanced users has been established as positively co-related to the competitiveness 
of a country and its corporations (Porter, 1990; Fagerberg, 1995). 
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Multinationals may of course crowd out domestic firms (UNCTAD, 2002; UNCTAD 2003) 
and Rath (1993) explores a number of negative effects of FDI, among them tied input 
purchases, profit reallocation, and restricted exports. Bartlett and Ghoshal (1990) suggested 
four types of international innovation management, namely (1) central-for-global, (2) local-
for-local, (3) locally-linked, and (4) globally-linked. However, Lundvall and Borrås (1997) 
claims that the most pertinent form of globalisation is the exploitation abroad of technologies 
explored in the home country (central-for-global), and multinationals often prefer to maintain 
existing linkages with companies in their home country (Lall, 1995; Ögütçü, 2002)34. It 
should be safe to state that centralized home country research and dependency on home 
country suppliers may be strengthened as a consequence of a low level of technological 
capabilities in the host country (Kim, 2001). 
 
2.6 Policy Considerations and Justifications 
 
There is substantial disagreement whether or not governments should intervene in a country’s 
economic process with the use of certain policies. Liberalists tend to put strong confidence in 
‘natural’ market mechanisms as the only intervention needed, while interventionists believe 
that certain market failures justify and, indeed, necessitate government intervention in order 
to achieve the development desired. The most basic form of market failure is the risk of 
underinvestment, most likely to occur in an industry with a large number of small actors 
involving high R&D costs (Stiglitz, 1997). Other basic market failures include network 
externalities and increasing returns. 
                                                 
34 It should be noted that this trend might be changing to some extent. Recent development in offshore 
investments shows that companies move a wider scope of activities to new countries. Whereas manufacturing 
used to be the main activity outsourced, companies now have moved or say they plan to move activities like 
R&D, call centers, distribution, logistics, and treasury operations abroad (AT Kearney, 2003). 
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The TSER projects have resulted in two more comprehensive typologies of failures 
justifying government intervention, namely those of Keith Smith and Frank Malerba 
(Lundvall & Borrås, 1997). These typologies focus on market failures that are solely 
connected to financial mechanisms (as those previously mentioned). The typologies 
presented in Tables 2.4 and 2.5 result in the ‘new policy paradigm’ that will be discussed 
shortly. 
 
Table 2.4: Keith Smith’s Four Types of Market Failures 
Failure Trademarks Possible intervention 
Infrastructure and 
investment 
Underinvestment in physical 
(communication and transport) or science-
technology (universities, public 
laboratories) infrastructure 
Incentives and subsidies for private 
and public provision of 
infrastructure 
Transition  Firms are highly competent in one specific 
field, but not in complementary fields 
 
Lock-in Firms get locked in to a particular 
technological paradigm 
Nurture emerging technological 
systems 
Institutional Institutions and regulations having 
negative effects on the rate of innovation 
Monitor and assess regulatory 
performance 
Adapted from Lundvall and Borrås (1997, pp. 55-6) 
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Table 2.5: Franco Malerba’s Types of Market Failures 
Failure Trademarks Possible intervention 
Learning Firms not able to learn rapidly and 
efficiently 
Human capital programmes, 
support for industrial R&D, public 
procurement 
Exploitation – exploration Skewed balance between exploration 
(radical innovation) and exploitation 
(incremental innovation) 
Maintain technological rivalry, 
introduce industry diversity, 
develop common infrastructure 
Variety – selection Skewed balance between variety (niche 
products) and selection (common 
denominator products) 
Antitrust and competition policies 
Appropriability Too strong appropriability regimes hamper 
the dissemination of knowledge 
Patent legislation 
Complementarities Appropriate complementarities may not be 
present or the firm is not connected to an 
innovation system 
Supporting formation of R&D 
networks, industry-university 
interfaces, bridging institutions 
 Adapted from Lundvall and Borrås (1997, pp. 56-7) 
 
 
Lundvall and Borrås (1997) synthesize these failures in three trade-off dilemmas: 
• The exploitation – exploration dilemma (lock-in, exploration, and selection 
failures). 
• The integration – flexibility dilemma (transition, complementarity, and learning 
failures). 
• The diversity – harmonising dilemma: In order to achieve economies of scale and 
efficient production there is a need for accepted technology and legislation 
standards. On the other hand, in order to achieve fruitful learning there is a need 
for a diversity and asymmetric distribution of knowledge. 
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These three dilemmas fund what Lundvall and Borrås (1997, p. 62) in the report on the TSER 
projects refers to as the new policy paradigm:  
 
The new policy paradigm focuses on creating adaptable innovation systems. 
This includes three interrelated issues: firstly, stimulating learning institutions 
and economic actors; secondly, developing integrative and coordinated policy 
visions and instruments for enhancing innovation; and thirdly, creating the 
conditions for a policy-making process which is also learning and adapting 
constantly to the new demands and conditions of the economy.35 
 
Unfortunately, this paradigm is too comprehensive to be thoroughly discussed in this 
document. This next section will hence focus on policy considerations concerning network 
formations, learning and FDI.  
Policies on network formations relates to Smith’s ‘transition failure’, Malerba’s 
‘complementarities failure’, and the integration-flexibility dilemma of the TSER report. 
Creating industrial networks for innovative purposes is not easily achieved by direct policy 
measures as it requires an existing critical mass of corporations, research institutions, and 
skills that provide connection points for new entrants (Schmitz, 2003). The fact that networks 
often have strong elements of informality, individual connections, and require tacit catalysts 
in order to persevere implies that government policies predominantly will be limited to 
facilitating measures. One exception might be when government agencies act as customers, 
using government procurement as a policy action. In order for this policy to facilitate network 
creation, the government agency needs to procure technologies or goods that are not currently 
available in the market place (in order to stimulate innovative efforts) and that have a 
magnitude that can’t be met by one single actor (Lundvall & Borrås, 1997; Arocena & Sutz, 
                                                 
35 The policy actions implied by this new policy paradigm are almost exclusively directed towards the conduct 
of economic actors in a system of innovation. This is of course not covering the entire policy regime needed to 
achieve development. Other areas will include equality, health, environment, culture, and social well-being 
(Johnson & Lundvall, 2003). 
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2003). More indirect schemes for stimulating industry and innovation networks include 
(Lundvall & Borrås, 1997) 
• Promoting awareness. 
• Facilitating of informal contacts and thematic working groups. 
• Helping to bring firms together by supporting brokerage. 
• Supporting collaborative facilities and technical services. 
• Providing financial support for networks and interfirm co-operation. 
 
Malerba’s possible interventions for complementary failures also include industry-university 
interfaces, confirming the importance of the previously mentioned horizontal firm-knowledge 
producer linkages. Policies for stimulating network formations may be the most important 
discussed in this paper, due to its fundamental importance for learning and innovation 
(UNCTAD, 2004b). 
Rationale for policies for learning obviously include Malerba’s ‘learning failure’, 
but also Smith’s ‘transition’ and ‘lock-in’ failures, and the TSER report’s exploitation-
exploration and integration-flexibility dilemmas. Similar to the creation of industrial 
networks, learning is a policy area which is highly tacit and where direct policy measures are 
not easily found and employed. Learning is, by nature, a process which is hampered by 
detailed regulations and interventions (as a considerable part of the learning achieved is 
learning that was not aimed for in the first place) (Lundvall & Borrås, 1997). Hence, in order 
to promote learning a government’s task will be - through functional interventions36 - to 
provide stable macroeconomic environments where companies and organisations wish to 
invest in learning activities (Lall, 2000). As we have seen earlier, in the discussion on 
                                                 
36 “Functional interventions are, for instance, the fostering of primary or secondary schooling, the provision of 
basic infrastructure, or the stimulation of export orientation. Selective interventions involve influencing the 
allocation of resources between activities, as by trade restrictions, credit allocation/subsidization, discrimination 
of technology or foreign investment inflows, and so on.” (Lall, 1998) [article read in HTML format; accurate 
page numbering not available] 
36 
learning and technological capabilities, effective learning is based on prior learning. Indeed, 
Lall (1993, pp. 270-1) states that “[…] the ability of firms to produce new capabilities 
depends on […] organisational and managerial skills in the firm and its ability to change 
structures to absorb new methods and technologies”. This implies that one main area of 
interest for public policies on learning is to provide a satisfactory basic education that later 
enables the work force to perform more specific learning activities (Nelson, 1993). Other 
measures include Malerba’s suggestions of human capital programmes and support for 
industrial R&D, secure social security, and maintain social cohesion (Nelson & Soete, 1987). 
Policies for FDI can be grouped in two categories; policies for attracting FDI and 
policies for exploiting FDI already present in the country. The former would obviously relate 
to Smith’s ‘infrastructure and investment failure’, while the latter can be connected to 
Malerba’s ‘appropriability failure’. In order to attract FDI capital countries need to provide an 
attractive macroeconomic and infrastructural environment, display sufficient human talent, 
and offer a satisfactory network of suppliers of complementary assets (Ögütçü, 2002; AT 
Kearney, 2003). Policy measures to achieve this are thus closely related to the measures 
already mentioned when discussing the formation of industry networks and learning 
activities, as these areas have significant impact on the technological capabilities of a 
country. Policies for guiding the effect of FDI already in the country offer many more direct 
possibilities. It should however be mentioned that none of these measures are universal, and 
that the policy package must be tailored to a country’s capacities and opportunities 
(UNCTAD, 2001). Lall (1995, pp. 526-7) offers a comprehensive list of possible policy 
measures regarding FDI that is presented in Table 2.6. 
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Table 2.6: FDI Policy Instruments and Their Effects 
Instrument of policy Employment effects and policy requirements 
Quantity of FDI Larger quantity of FDI will lead to higher employment, unless it crowds 
out substantial local investment. Essential to have stable, transparent and 
non-discriminatory FDI regime 
Sectors/activities open to TNCs37 Initially, FDI in labour-intensive operations will create more employment, 
but over time TNCs will need to move into more complex technologies to 
promote higher quality employment. A targeted promotion strategy is 
called for 
Mode of entry 
(greenfield/takeover) 
Greenfield investments are likely to lead to more employment creation 
initially, but takeovers may be beneficial if new technologies, skills and 
exports result 
Tax and other incentives Tax incentives may increase FDI in the short term although long-term FDI 
depends more on economic fundamentals. Targeted incentives can be 
useful in guiding TNCs to particular incentives, technologies and skills, 
and achieving beneficial “deep” integration and alliances 
Performance requirements TNC performance requirements set by host countries can raise the quantity 
and quality of local employment, but could deter TNC entry if imposed 
rigidly; setting them by negotiation is preferable 
Extent of local participation 
required 
Insistence on local participation in FDI may increase diffusion of 
technology and skills, but may deter investment in technology and export-
intensive activities. It may be preferable to build up local enterprises’ 
competitive capabilities and to encourage strategic alliances with TNCs 
International agreements Tax and other agreements to promote FDI can help to increase 
employment in TNCs if they do not distort economic fundamentals 
Adapted from Lall (Lall, 1995, pp. 526-7) 
 
 
Performance requirements (row 5 in Table 2.6) on the foreign investor are among the most 
debated policy options available, and deserve some more attention. According to an 
UNCTAD study (2003), some of the most common rationales for imposing performance 
requirements are to strengthen the industrial base and increasing domestic value added, to 
generate employment opportunities, and to promote linkages and technology transfer. Such 
policy measures thus offer a powerful tool for governments that wish to enhance the affects 
                                                 
37 Transnational corporations 
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of FDI presence. However, due to restrictions resulting from international trade agreements 
the use of a number of these requirements is prohibited. Table 2.7 lists some of the 
requirements that due to these agreements are not tolerated. The table presents them in two 
categories; those that are prohibited by the WTO agreement on Trade-Related Investment 
Measures (TRIMs) and those that are prohibited or discouraged in one or several regional 
trade agreements (e.g. EU, NAFTA, or among two countries or trade sectors). Breaching 
these agreements will very plausibly lead to formal or informal trade restrictions with the 
perpetrating country. 
 
Table 2.7: Prohibited or Discouraged FDI Performance Requirements 
Category Performance requirement 
Local content requirements 
Trade-balancing requirements 
Foreign exchange restrictions related to the foreign-exchange inflows 
attributable to an enterprise 
Prohibited by the TRIMs 
Agreement38 
Export controls 
Requirements to establish a joint venture with domestic participation 
Requirements for a minimum level of domestic equity participation 
Requirements to locate headquarters for a specific region 
Employment requirements 
Export requirements 
Restrictions on sales of goods or services in the territory where they are 
produced or provided 
Requirements to supply goods produced or services provided to a specific 
region exclusively from a given territory 
Requirements to act as the sole supplier of goods produced or services 
provided 
Requirements to transfer technology, production processes or other 
proprietary knowledge 
Prohibited, conditioned or 
discouraged by IIAs39 at bilateral 
or regional levels 
Research and development requirements 
Adapted from UNCTAD (2003, p. 3) 
 
                                                 
38 Prohibited by the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) due to inconsistency 
with Articles III and XI of GATT/1994. 
39 International Investment Agreement 
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2.7 Summarizing the Theoretical Foundations 
 
The theoretical constructs covered so far in this paper are of a quite wide scope. Before 
embarking on the empirical and analytical parts of the paper, I therefore wish to summarize 
what has been presented. This is done in order to give a rationale for performing the 
empirical investigations, and in order to build an analytical framework on which discussions 
will be based.  
The National Systems of Innovation framework relies heavily on the concept of 
interactive learning, implying that effective innovation hardly ever takes places outside an 
interactive context. One of the main prerequisites for such learning to be fruitful, in fact even 
to occur is an asymmetry of tacit and/or codified information (which of course is fundamental 
to any form of learning between individuals). This seems to imply that there, in a given 
economic area, must be agents who possess more information and knowledge than their 
colleagues. This economic area may of course vary in size, ranging from asymmetric 
information on a particular production process to technological frontrunners in an entire 
industry. Although the most frequent level of analysis in NSI literature is macro rather than 
micro; in terms of the carrying out of innovations there appears to be little disagreement that 
the main agents are companies within the system of innovation (CIRCLE, 2004),. It thus 
seems safe to assume that the vitality and competitiveness of a system of innovation depends 
on the existence of companies with favourable knowledge positions; a system where all 
companies have an equal knowledge position would in fact have ended up in the neo-classical 
equilibrium. 
Given that the national system of innovation in question is a developing country it 
seems likely that a large proportion of these leading companies will be results of foreign 
direct investments. Obviously, these companies benefit from being able to tap into an 
40 
international pool of research and development efforts confidential and unique to that 
company. Even though the research is usually not performed in the developing country per 
se, the knowledge obtained from these efforts will be embedded in the technological products 
and organisational processes of the company’s subsidiary in the developing country, giving 
the company a knowledge advantage. This knowledge advantage could put the foreign 
company in a very central position when developing national technological capabilities; 
working as a demanding customer, an enabling supplier, major research partner, and 
influential employer. It is however quite problematic having foreign controlled companies 
hold such a central position in a developing system of innovation. Firstly, they may to a large 
extent rely on basic research and product development performed in the home country, and, 
secondly, they may also tend to prefer maintaining ties with foreign suppliers originally 
favoured by the mother company. This can be traced to the relatively lower level of 
technological capabilities in the host country’s system of innovation and the lack of cultural 
proximity to suppliers in the host country, which will be detrimental to the communication 
with and trust of prospective domestic business partners. Such a practise, even though 
understandable and defendable, may in turn lead to less knowledge spillovers and 
consequently to less-than-optimal development of domestic technological capabilities. 
This may leave a developing country’s administration with quite a conundrum. 
Attracting qualitatively benign foreign direct investments requires having an attractive system 
of innovation with a satisfactory level of technological capabilities. On the other hand, the 
development of such a system of innovation may rely on the presence of qualitatively benign 
foreign direct investments. Given this, selective as well as universal policy measures may be 
desirable as well as necessary. However, choosing the right policy measures obviously relies 
on a good understanding of the current state of the domestic innovation system. 
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The empirical (descriptive) part of this paper describes how a foreign company 
situated in Turkey (de facto a developing country) act in relation with their network partners. 
This level of description is chosen due to the obvious, but often seemingly neglected, 
importance of companies in theories on national systems of innovation and economic 
development (Coriat & Weinstein, 1999 and Teece, 2000 respectively). I agree with Shulin 
Gu (Gu, 1999, p. 16) in saying that measuring a complex system at an aggregate level does 
not give enough information on the actual performance of the system  
 
[…] There is a danger of down-playing the concept of national innovation 
systems approach. It comes from a mistaking of the notions of ‘systems’ as if 
piling-up national statistics of nearly every thing, from R&D, patent, to trade, 
represents a system, and it confuses the system’s approach 
 
The empirical descriptions will be categorized in the fashion laid out in chapter 1.2 
(horizontal and vertical relationships). The analytical part of the thesis will discuss how the 
foreign company interact with, in particular, Turkish partners, and in turn which affect this 
may have on the development of Turkey’s technological capabilities. Rounding up the paper, 
the concluding (normative) part of the paper will discuss what policy possibilities might be 
employed to amend any weaknesses discovered in the analysis. This thesis can of course not 
provide a full answer to these questions; due to its obvious methodological shortcomings (see 
chapter 2.3), it will merely act as an indication of possibilities for future research.  
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2.8 Methodological Issues 
 
This chapter discusses the research model chosen for this study, and the rationale behind it. 
Chapter 2.8.1 deals with the ontology and epistomology of the thesis, chapter 2.8.2 describes 
the research model, and chapter 2.8.3 takes a critical look at the choices I made in this 
respect. 
 
2.8.1 Science Philosophy 
 
The methodology of a paper is doubtlessly based in the author’s science philosophy; her/his 
stands on ontology and epistomology in particular. The term ontology is used to denote any 
assumptions a person holds about the world; the ontological view a person holds will thus 
influence basic views about the reality (Morgan, 1983). Epistomology concerns how 
knowledge is created and how a person can achieve such knowledge (Oliga, 1988). Pettersen 
(1993) summarizes possible combinations of ontologies and epistomologies as shown in 
Table 2.8. 
 
Table 2.8: Ontologies and According Epistomologies 
 Ontology Epistomology 
Subjective Projection of consciousness (nominalism) Situational logical knowledge 
Social construction Understanding of social reality 
Real symbolic speech Symbolic patterns 
Contextual field of information Depiction of context  
Actual process Systems, processes, changes 
Objective Actual structure (realism) Positivistic science 
 (Pettersen, 1993) 
 
 
  43 
As shown by earlier discussions, I agree that industrial relationships involve a large extent of 
tacit elements and connections on a personal level. This would imply that the 
ontology/epistomology of this paper is on the subjective side of the continuum in Table 2.8. 
The ontology contains elements of ‘social construction’ (as the perception of networks in my 
high mind is highly subjective) as well as ‘contextual field of information’ (as information 
must be seen in the context of certain given innovation system parameters). The 
epistomology leading to the choice of method would thus be the ‘understanding of social 
reality’ and ‘depiction of context’. 
 
2.8.2 Research Model 
 
A schematic view on the research process, as seen by Ringdal (2001) is depicted in Figure 
2.4. This section will focus on steps 3, 4 and 5, as the two first steps are outlined in the 
introduction of this paper (step 6 is this written report). 
 
 
 
1. Problem area 
2. Research questions 
3. Choice of design 
4. Data gathering 
5. Data analysis 
6. Reporting
Figure 2.4: The Research Process (Ringdal, 2001)
Theory study 
Descriptive Normative 
Figure 2.5: Structure of the Study 
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This dissertation consists of three main parts; one theoretic, one descriptive (of the case 
study’s network conduct), and one normative40 (analysis and recommendations based on the 
descriptive part) as seen in Figure 2.5.  
As the descriptive part of the study concerns, I have already pointed out that this 
thesis is based on a rather subjective ontology and epistomology. Combined with the fact the 
number of studied cases is low, while the number of parameters researched is high, this 
clearly indicates that a qualitative research design should be chosen. According to Yin (1989) 
the possibilities would be observation, experiment, or interview. Observation is clearly non-
feasible as the research interest often is non-observable and the fact that network interactions 
have a far longer time horizon than research within this paper would allow. Experiments 
would require a full control of all parameters, which is clearly not viable for the research 
topic. The instrument of data gathering was thus chosen to be qualitative interviews with 
representatives from the case object. The interviews have been performed as a midway 
between reflexive and structured interviews (Kvale, 1994), using an interview guide to assure 
that all relevant topics would be included during the interview. Thus, to return to the 
epistomology, interviews will serve as a means of ‘understanding a social reality’ while the 
‘depiction of context’ is performed with Chapter 3 describing the Turkish system of 
innovation. 
 
 
 
                                                 
40 This implies that the cases studied are of intrinsic interest for the descriptive part, while being of instrumental 
interest for the normative part (Stake, 1994). 
Choice of 
cases 
Choice of 
instruments 
Fieldwork Data 
analysis 
Create un-
derstanding 
Figure 2.6: How to Build Theory from Case Studies (adapted (Eisenhardt, 1989)) 
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The normative part of the study is somehow dubious, as the scale and scope due to the time 
limit on the writing of the thesis and the empirical data is severely limited. However, in order 
to make recommendations in the end of this paper, the research design has been chosen in 
accordance with the framework of Kathleen Eisenhardt (1989) in Figure 2.6; a framework 
designed for building theory from case studies. The case study was chosen, in accordance 
with my supervisor Prof. Dr. Hacer Ansal, to be a Turkish subsidiary of a multinational 
company (1) The intention was originally to compare the findings from this company with a 
Turkish competitor. Unfortunately, none of the contacted Turkish companies agreed to 
participate in the study. As previously mentioned, interviews were chosen as instruments (2). 
The fieldwork was conducted (3) as interviews with representatives from the company’s 
Human Resource (or equivalent), Logistics & Procurement (or equivalent), and Sales & 
Marketing (or equivalent) departments. It was also intended to perform interviews with the 
Research & Development department; however, the company has no research efforts in 
Turkey. The interviews were performed in the interviewee’s office and durations ranged 
between 30 and 45 minutes. The interviews were recorded and transcripted immediately after 
finishing. The transcript was in turn sent to the interviewee for confirmation. 
The data analysis (4) was performed by indexing the transcripts using category 
variables (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). These variables were created as a result of my 
understanding resulting from the theory study and where I was expecting to find relevant 
information. The category variables are thus strongly connected to the description of 
empirical findings as well as the interview guide used. In order to create understanding (5) I 
try, with this written report, to translate and connect the categories together in one coherent 
whole. 
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2.8.3 Critique of Methods and Sources 
 
The main critique against the methods employed in this thesis is the lacking triangulation of 
empirical data. It was the intention to interview representatives from a Turkish company in 
order to provide such triangulation. Two Turkish companies (comparable to the foreign 
company interviewed) were contacted with this in mind. However, due to a number of 
factors, including language barriers, none of these companies were willing to participate in 
the study. The effects on the results and analysis of this paper is quite apparent; without a 
Turkish company as a comparative ground it looses some share of its significance. Turkish 
companies may act in the same fashion as the foreign company in this study, rendering some 
of the analysis obsolete. However, initial conversations with one of the Turkish companies 
revealed that this company’s practises diverged from that of the researched company in a 
number of areas. Unfortunately, the information obtained from these conversations is not 
sufficiently explored for use as empirical data. It does, however, to some extent ease the 
problem of the lacking triangulation. Information from these initial conversations is included 
as footnotes in the presentation of the empiric material. 
Using interviews for collecting data obviously presents methodological issues of its 
own. In this particular case there were some problems with languages, as the interviews were 
performed in English. This may have resulted in misunderstanding of both question and 
answer. However, I think that providing the interviewees with transcripts will eliminate any 
severe errors. The second problem with using interviews is of course the fact that the analysis 
of the data will be relatively subjective (as opposed to quantitative survey data). The analysis 
and discussions in this paper are, obviously, influenced by my personal beliefs. 
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C H A P T E R   3 
A   B R I E F   D E S C R I P T I O N   O F   T H E   T U R K I S H   S Y S T E M   O F   I N N O V A T I O N 
 
It is not the intention of this document to give a full account of the Turkish system of 
innovation; such a task would be far out of scale and scope. Rather, I wish to explore some of 
the aspects of the system of innovation in order to provide a background for the discussion to 
follow later. Hence, the aspects discussed here will be related to the theoretical ground that 
has been covered this far. It will thus be related to educational aspects (Chapter 3.1), industry 
structure (3.2), the macroeconomic climate (3.3), and foreign direct investments (3.4). 
 
3.1 Education and Research 
 
Dutz and colleagues (2003) claim that one of Turkey’s main competitive advantages as a 
country compared to other Central European Emerging Economies (CEEEs) is the well 
educated and flexible workforce. It is of course hard to establish this using measurable data, 
but, as we have seen earlier, basic education may work as an intermediary measure. Table 3.1 
shows that the gross enrolment rate is growing for all levels of education. This is also 
reflected in Figure 3.1, which shows how Turkey’s workforce is composed according to 
education levels. However, it should be emphasized that increasing the aggregate level of 
education is not in any way causally related to positive economic growth. Its effect on 
economic development relies heavily on, for instance, an egalitarian access to education and 
a market-oriented macroeconomic climate (López et al, 1998). 
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Table 3.1: Gross Enrolment Ratios for Four Levels of Education 
 Primary Secondary Tertiary Higher 
1960 75 % 16 % N/A N/A 
1965 101 % N/A 4 % N/A 
1970 110 % 27 % 5% 6 % 
1975 108 % 29 % N/A N/A 
1980 96 % 35 % 5 % 6 % 
1985 113 % 42 % 9 % 10 % 
1990 99 % 47 % 13 % 16 % 
1995 107 % 57 % 19 % 22 % 
(Yoltar, 2002, p. 34) 
 
 
 
 
Although the educational level of Turkey’s workforce has improved (as shown in Figure 3.1) 
there is still unexploited potential, particularly related to the relatively low female workforce 
participation. The average female ratio of students in secondary and tertiary school has 
exceeded 40% for the last decade, without this leading to substantial improvement of female 
workforce participation (McKinsey, 2003). As Goldin (1994) has shown, high female 
workforce participation is positively correlated with high wages, high GDP and low share of 
agriculture in GDP; all trademarks of developed economies. The gap between female 
education enrolment and workforce participation indicates a substantial hidden 
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unemployment rate for highly qualified women, which, if exploited, could speeden the 
economical and technological development of Turkey. 
As Table 3.2 displays, the majority of Turkish research is performed by universities, 
even though the ratio of private enterprises’ research investments has increased since 1990. 
The strength of the university sector suggests that firm-university cooperation should be 
rather fruitful. However, according to Yoltar (2002), state initiatives for cooperation have yet 
to prove considerable yield. The initiatives include the 1996 TUBITAK “University-Industry 
Research Centers” programme, the setting up of techno-parks, and “Technology 
Development Centers”; a result of a July 2001 legislation (Yoltar, 2002). 
 
Table 3.2: Gross Expenditure on R&D by Sector of Performance 
 Business Government University 
 SEE41 Private   
1990 2 % 18 % 10 % 70 % 
1991 21 % 8 % 71 % 
1992 24 % 8 % 68 % 
1993 23 % 10 % 67 % 
1994 25 % 9 % 67 % 
1995 24 % 7 % 69 % 
1996 N/A N/A N/A 
1997 N/A N/A N/A 
1998 3 % 28 % 7 % 61 % 
1999 3 % 35 % 7 % 55 % 
2000 3 % 30 % 6 % 60 % 
Adapted from Yoltar (Yoltar, 2002, p. 32) 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
41 State Economic Enterprises 
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3.2 Industry Structure and Trademarks 
 
Turkish industry policies have to a large extent focused on low growth in wage levels, in 
order to stay competitive in the world market (Yoltar, 2002). Figure 3.2 shows how this has 
lead to a tremendous growth in manufactured exports, which is traditionally labour intensive. 
However, aggregate export as a contributor to GDP stays relatively constant. This could 
indicate that Turkish technological competitiveness is not developing as rapid as one could 
desire; a view that is supported by the fact that the ratio of low-tech products to total 
manufactured exports have stayed between 70-80% since 1965 (Yoltar, 2002). 
 
 
 
A 2003 study by Didem Baser, Diana Farrell and David Meen (Baser et al, 2003) studied the 
Turkish industry structure with the aim of finding potential for productivity growth. Figure 
3.3 shows how the productivity of some important industries is well below best practice 
countries (given the y-value 100); the average productivity being only 40% of best practice 
countries. Obviously, some of the industries included in Figure 3.3 are important 
infrastructure sectors, namely wireline and wireless telecommunications, and electricity 
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generation and distribution. As discussed earlier, weak performance in such sectors may be 
detrimental to a country’s economic and technological growth. 
 
 
 
 
The study explains the productivity problem with the large informal economy, 
macroeconomic and political instability and government ownership. The macroeconomic and 
political instability will be dealt with in the section on macroeconomic climate. This section 
will concentrate on the Turkish informal economy. 
Baser and colleagues found that Turkish industry can be divided in two. Firstly, 
there are modern, high-performing companies that have adopted cutting-edge technology and 
maintain international competitiveness. The average productivity of these companies is 62% 
of US level. However, there is a traditional sector which employs about half the work force 
and displays a productivity level well beyond 25% of US level. In a well-functioning 
economy these companies would not be able to survive in the market place, due to their 
consequently low margins. However, the majority of these traditional companies improve 
their operation margins by operating informally; for instance by failing to pay VAT or social 
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security payments, not adhering to hygiene or product quality standards, or by paying less 
than minimum wages. This undeserved competitive advantage allows these companies to 
continue using often 30-40 year old technologies with exceptionally low productivity levels 
(Baser et al, 2003). 
The study found no regulatory loopholes that would allow these companies to avoid 
their social obligations. It thus concludes that the problem largely lies in the weak 
enforcement of existing laws; naming one striking example of how Turkish governments 
since 1963 has issued ten tax amnesties, often allowing companies to pay in old Turkish lira 
values (which gives a large financial gain in a country where the inflation in the 1980s and 
1990s hovered around 60%) (Baser et al, 2003). 
 
3.3 Macroeconomic Climate 
 
Turkey has in its recent history been struck by a number of political and economic crises; it is 
frequently referred to as a yoyo-economy with rapid expansions followed by subsequent 
drastic contractions. Baser and colleagues claim that the volatile Turkish macroeconomic 
climate is due to historically weak and short-lived governments (Baser et al, 2003). This 
claim is supported by a 2002 World Bank study on political stability where Turkey ranked 
74th out of 106 developing countries, between Lebanon and Bangladesh42. 
A low political stability has tremendous negative effects on the investment climate 
of a country’s industry. Firstly, the aversion towards investment is cemented by the sky-high 
real interest rates. In the 1990s real interest rates averaged about 20%, with extremes of about 
90% following the currency devaluation in 2001 (Baser et al, 2003). High real interest rates 
lead to bank savings as a preferred means of investment and highly expensive loans; both 
                                                 
42 Source: http://publications.worldbank.org/subscriptions/WDI/ 
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factors detrimental to the investment climate. Figure 3.4 shows an example of income 
distribution for a large Turkish retailer. We can clearly see that the revenues resulting from 
the company’s operations (operating income) is negligible compared to non-operating 
revenues (bank deposits and other non-strategic financial investments). Needless to say, with 
such an income distribution, the incentives for making investments in operating capabilities 
are severely hampered. 
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Secondly, tremendously high inflation rates, combined with the low wage growth in Turkey, 
lead to decreasing purchasing power. This will in turn have negative effects on the incentives 
of companies to invest and innovate, since the market expectations are highly unpredictable 
when they are not negative. Table 3.3 shows the rate of inflation in Turkey from 1991 to 
2002. 
 
Table 3.3: The Rate of Inflation in Turkey 1981-2002 
1981-1990 1991-1995 1996-2000 2000 2001 2002 
46,3% 79,3% 74,1% 54,9% 54,4% 45% 
 (Domaç, 2004, p. 2) 
 
 
Figure 3.4: Income Distribution for a Turkish Retailer (Baser et al, 2003) 
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Thirdly, the level of corruption in Turkey is perceived to be very high. A 2002 survey by 
Transparency International performed among business people and risk analysts on their 
perceptions of a country’s level of corruption, ranked Turkey 64th of 102 countries. Turkey 
scored 3.2 on a scale from 0 (highly corrupt) to 10 (highly clean), placing it among countries 
like El Salvador, Thailand, Senegal and Panama (Transparency International, 2002). A 2002 
study by the World Bank ranked Turkey 53rd among 106 developing countries concerning 
control of corruption, placing it between Iran and the Dominican Republic43. Evidently, high 
levels of corruption will be detrimental to, in particular, foreign investors. 
Finally, there has been much talk about Turkey’s possible EU accession in 2007 and 
its positive effect on the Turkish economic climate. However, even leaving the obvious 
political, cultural and religious aspects out, there are still a high number of remaining 
obstacles to an accession. Although Turkey has managed to slow down the consumer price 
index (from 68,5% in 2001 to 10,2% in August 2004) it is still well beyond the requirement 
for EU accession at 2,5%. The image repeats itself for budget balance (-13,2% in 2002, EU 
accession requirement -3,0%) and public debt stock as percentage of GDP (100%, req. 80%) 
(McKinsey, 2003). 
 
3.4 Foreign Direct Investment 
 
Turkey has never experienced the surge in foreign direct investment inflows of comparable 
countries. Figure 3.5 shows the historical development of inflows from 1970 to 1998. The 
World Bank estimated that the inflows in 2000 and 2001 were, respectively, 982 and 3266 
million USD. Even though there is an increasing trend in the absolute amount of inflow, the 
                                                 
43 Source: http://publications.worldbank.org/subscriptions/WDI/ 
  55 
relative importance is stable, hovering around 0.4 % of GDP; a low figure compared to other 
CEEEs44.  
 
Figure 3.5: FDI Inflow to Turkey (Adapted (Yoltar, 2002, p. 38)
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The importance of increasing the level of FDI inflows is recognized and there are currently 
efforts being made to improve the investment environment in order to attract foreign capital, 
both in cooperation with external organisations such as FIAS45 and internally in setting up an 
Investment Consulting Council46. The restrictions put on foreign investors are very few, both 
as a consequence of Turkey’s WTO membership since 1995 which, as shown earlier, 
prohibits most restrictive practices on performance requirements, the EU Customs Union of 
199647, and law 4875 of June 200348. 
 
                                                 
44 Central European countries may be used for comparison regarding FDI as they display similarities in terms of 
geographical advantages, newly opened economies, and to some extent educational composition. Some CEEEs 
and their FDI/GDP ratio for 2001: Czech Republic (8.6%), Croatia (7.7%), Bulgaria (5.1%), Georgia (4.9%), 
Hungary (4.7%), Poland (3.1%), Romania (2.9%), and Belarus (0.8%). Source: 
http://devdata.worldbank.org/data-query/ 
45 Foreign Investment Advisory Service, http://www.fias.net/data/mena.html 
46 Cihan News Agency, 16.03.2004 
47 The 2003 Accession Partnership explicitly states that Turkey should remove all restrictions affecting FDI 
originating from EU countries (Dutz et al, 2003). 
48 “[Law 4875] replaces the old FDI approval and screening system with a notification and registration system, 
bans nationalization without fair compensation, guarantees national treatment to foreign investors, does not 
restrict FDI in any sectors or impose any performance requirements, eliminates the old minimum capital limit, 
grants foreign investors full convertibility in their transfers of capital and earnings, allows them to own property 
without any restrictions, and recognizes foreign investors’ right to international arbitration.” (Erdilek, 2003, p. 
93) 
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Analysts disagree to some extent on the reasons for the lack of inflows and the 
prospects for future inflows. Dutz and colleagues claim that Turkey’s possible EU accession 
will attract more foreign investors (Dutz et al, 2003). However, as we have seen, such an 
accession is quite far away and, additionally, Turkey’s Customs Union with EU of 1996 has 
yet to show any improving effect on FDI inflows. It can not, however, be neglected that 
Turkey has an extremely favourable geographical position and an interesting demographic 
composition, which should be attractive for future foreign investments (Dutz et al, 2003). 
The Baser and colleagues study ascribe Turkey’s lack of inflows to a large informal 
economy, macroeconomic and political instability, and government ownership; the same 
factors they found to handicap general productivity in Turkish industry (Baser et al, 2003). 
Erdilek (2003) separates the causes in economic and non-economic causes. The former 
includes high transaction cost of entry and operation, chronic high inflation, increasing 
economic instability, historical inward orientation, lack of IPR49 protection, lack of inflation 
accounting and internationally acceptable accounting standards, failure of privatization, 
insufficient legal structures and inadequate infrastructure. The latter encompasses chronic 
political instability, internal conflicts, historical animosity towards foreign economic 
presence, fear of foreign political domination, lack of FDI promotion, and the structure of 
Turkish industry. 
                                                 
49 Intellectual Property Rights 
  57 
 
C H A P T E R   4 
E M P I R I C A L   F I N D I N G S 
 
According to an agreement with the studied company, the names of neither company nor 
interviewees will be disclosed; thus it will merely be referred to as ‘the company’ throughout 
the paper. Worldwide the company employs approximately 470 000 people in 190 countries; 
it is truly one of the world’s most influential multinationals. Its Turkish history dates back to 
1856, although the Turkish subsidiary was formally established as a joint venture with a 
Turkish partner in 1958. The subsidiary became a fully owned division in 2000. Today, the 
company employs approximately 3100 people in Turkey and offers products and services in 
the electronical systems and appliances and communication sectors. The total sales of the 
Turkish subsidiary amounted to EUR 630 million in the 2003 fiscal year (1st of October 2002 
to 30th of September 2003). The company is organized in a number of separate business 
units; the interviewees from Sales & Marketing and Logistics work in one of these business 
units, while the interviewee from Human Resource is employed in the central HR unit. 
This chapter presents the information obtained from the interviewees. The 
information is grouped under the headings established in Chapter 2.2 (horizontal firm-firm 
cooperation (Chapter 4.1), horizontal firm-knowledge producer cooperation (4.2), vertical 
customer linkage (4.3), and vertical supplier linkage (4.4)). The information presented in this 
chapter will be discussed and analysed in forthcoming chapters. 
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4.1 Horizontal Firm-Firm Cooperation 
 
This category of network linkages was included in order to capture any joint research and 
development between competitors (equal partners). As the company investigated in this thesis 
had no research and development efforts situated in Turkey, no such horizontal linkages 
could be discovered. It is, however, quite reasonable to believe that the company in its home 
country has such collaborations. Whether these foreignly originated research efforts are 
directed towards Turkish cooperation partners are unknown, but rather unlikely (as such 
information most likely would have surfaced in the interviews). 
The only horizontal firm-firm linkage that could be identified and discussed in the 
interviews was that of the flow of employees between competitors (as a form of knowledge 
spillovers or leakages). The average turn-over for the company’s employees is eight years. 
This does however include lay-offs initiated by the company itself, and does not discriminate 
between departments; the interviewee believed the turn-over to be relatively uniform among 
departments and divisions. The voluntary turn-over rate (employees leaving the company on 
own initiatives) is, according to the human resources interviewee, although quantitatively 
non-specified, very high. The turn-over is naturally negatively correlated with the length of 
the employee’s stay, and the company has identified the two year- and five year marks as key 
points for whether an employee will have a long career in the company.  
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4.2 Horizontal Firm-Knowledge Producer Cooperation 
 
Horizontal cooperation with knowledge producers was intended to capture two functions; 
namely that of competence building in the national work force and as a source of 
technological knowledge used for company innovation. For the latter of these, the situation is 
of course the same as in the previous chapter. No collaborative or absorptive efforts are made 
towards national educational or research institutions. Again, it is quite likely that the mother 
company performs such activities, but, yet again, it is quite unlikely that any of these 
activities are targeted towards Turkish institutions50. 
The human resources interviewee informed in the interview that about 90% of the 
employees (with graduations) come from Turkish universities51, the remainder mainly 
educated in the home country of the mother company. A share of the employees with foreign 
education is made up of Turkish citizens that have studied abroad and then returned for their 
professional career. One interviewee informed that the foreigners working in the company 
often are at higher management or technical expert levels.  
The company offers no financial support or incentives for their employees to return 
to state universities (or any other form of institution external to the company) in order to 
deepen or broaden their competencies. Other countries’ subsidiaries of this company do offer 
such financial support, especially for MBA trainings. Furthermore, the company offers a five 
level management training development programme. Only the two lower levels are provided 
by the Turkish subsidiary. For further training employees are sent to company facilities in the 
mother company. In order to participate at these program levels, employees are also often 
                                                 
50 The Turkish company informs that they have performed joint research efforts with national universities. The 
nature and purpose of this collaboration is however unknown. They also engage in absorptive technology 
monitoring activities towards these national universities in order to foresee coming technologies. 
51 The proportion for the Turkish company is informed to be approximately 98% for undergraduates, and 
somewhat higher for post-graduates. 
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sent on language training in the United Kingdom (English is the working language of the 
company)52. 
The company yearly provides approximately 500 internship positions for students, 
ranging from high school to university level. The human resources representative estimated 
that as few as 5% of these internship students actually went on to work for the company full 
time when embarking professional careers. The reason for employing this many interns 
without the intention of further hiring is 
• Legal issues. Companies in Turkey must offer internships for high school students 
equal to 5% of their total work force. Hence, about 33% of the students/pupils 
employed by the company fall in this category. 
• Customer and employee relations. Large customers contact the company asking 
(“very strongly asks us”, according to one interview) them to hire friends or 
relatives of theirs. They will also offer positions for relatives of faithful employees 
when asked. The company sees this hiring as a long term investment in the 
relations with this particular customer or employee. 
• Educational skills. A small fraction of the total number of internship students is 
recruited based on their academic records. These hirings are made in order to 
increase the possibility of this particular student wanting to start their professional 
career in the company. 
 
The high number of student interns implicitly leads to these students having lower order work 
assignments. At the time of interview, 60 students were working in the accounting 
department. The real need of the accounting department was two internship positions. 
According to one interviewee, the majority of the students working on internship therefore 
                                                 
52 The Turkish company claims to offer virtually all its further education of employees in Turkish institutions. 
The extent of and quality of this education is however unknown. 
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merely perform supportive tasks around the office. In addition to the high number of 
internships, an interviewee estimated that five to ten students each year wrote their Master’s 
Thesises about or for the company. This is arranged by students offering research proposals 
to the company; if these proposals are coherent with the company’s current needs or ongoing 
projects the students are allowed access to the company’s resources. The company does not 
actively offer research projects53. 
The company yearly offers scholarships to approximately 6-7 students, with the 
additional opportunity of supporting internships later in their educational career. These 
students are monitored by following their GPA trajectory, and from time to time (this is no 
requirement made or serviced offered by the company) they confer with the company when 
faced with choices on elective courses. The company does not perform any active career 
guiding for students at any level, neither do they offer universities the possibility of using the 
company’s employees as guest lecturers. 
There was no mention in the interviews of requirements from the Turkish 
authorities regarding the company’s conduct towards state institutions (neither towards 
private agents). 
 
                                                 
53 The Turkish company informs that they actively support Master’s Thesises related to their manufacturing and 
design issues. Whether these Thesises are results of student offers or company projects’ needs is unknown. 
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4.3 Vertical Customer Linkage 
 
Vertical customer linkages were included to capture the important function of customers 
being hands-on indicators of new possibilities for market penetrations through new and/or 
improved products and for early indications of new markets and/or use situations. This 
company’s products are sold on three levels of outlets. Firstly, some products are sold 
directly from the company itself, secondly, the majority of products are sold to wholesale 
distributors, and, finally, a small proportion is directly sold to ‘corner shop stores’ for 
distribution to small customers. 
The products being sold directly from the company to end users contribute the only 
share of product development that is done by the company’s Turkish subsidiary. This passing 
of the two lower levels of distribution outlets is done when the quantity of the products sold 
constitutes a larger system of technology. The company then offers projecting services, 
making minor adjustments to the technology in order to fit the present customer’s particular 
needs. Contact with the two lower distribution levels is made solely on a financial basis; 
reporting sales volume of the previous period, ordering volumes for the forthcoming period, 
and, if applicable, making payments to the company based on the volume of products having 
been sold to end users. The only feedback coming from users at these two levels is made up 
of customer complaints and warranty claims. 
Regarding the impact on the product technology as a result of feedback from 
Turkish users; all technology amendments and alterations are made by the research and 
development department in the home country (as previously mentioned, the company has no 
research and development facilities in Turkey). Smaller alterations can be made on a very 
infrequent basis by the Turkish subsidiary, but these changes are very incremental and made 
on a technologically superficial level. Such minor changes must also be communicated to and 
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approved by the company’s mother’s research and development institution before being 
employed. 
According to the interviewee from markets and sales, the mother company does 
quite frequently make changes in the basic technology as a result of customers’ complaints or 
communicated needs. However, since the technology is supposed to be globally equal, such 
changes are only made if the source user market is sufficiently financially important for the 
mother company (the subsidiary making up a non-negligible fraction of the company’s total 
global sales). In this sense, the Turkish market is too small to have any impact on the global 
technology changes made by the mother’s research and development division. 
 
4.4 Vertical Supplier Linkage 
 
Vertical supplier linkages were included in order to capture the suppliers’ functioning as 
fulfiller of buyer’s requests and enabler of new product development by opening up new 
‘design spaces’. The term ‘supplier’ includes suppliers of technological components as well 
as suppliers of ‘soft’ functionalities (‘outsourcing’). 
The company buys an overwhelming majority of its technological components from foreign 
subsidiaries of the same global company. The amount originating from external companies is, 
according to the logistics interviewee, almost negligible. The main part of internally bought 
components originate from the central country (the main office), with the remainder coming 
from other European countries. 
Regarding the components bought from external companies, these products range 
from low- to high-tech components. The also differ in how central they are in the resulting 
technological system. They are, however, all generic technologies available from a multitude 
of sources (as discussed in Chapter 2.2.2). The screening and choosing of which supplier to 
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buy from is made by the Turkish subsidiary without any imposed directives from the mother 
company. All external suppliers are companies located in European countries other than 
Turkey54. Contact with component suppliers are made on an arm-length contractual basis, 
mainly exchanging quantitative data on amounts needed and prices offered. Suppliers do, 
however, maintain some sort of technical reporting to the logistics department, announcing 
their current technological developments. This reporting is used by the company to make 
future decisions on choices of suppliers (as no Turkish research and development facilities 
exists, these reports are naturally not used for altering technologies). 
Regarding suppliers of ‘soft’ resources, there are no imposed directives from the 
mother company on what suppliers to choose. According to the human resources interviewee 
there are however no substantial outsourcing of these activities; most of them are performed 
by institutions internal to the company. The activities actually outsourced include medical 
emergency assistance, employee satisfaction surveying, and some ICT services (in particular 
the construction of a recruitment web service). All outsourcing discussed in the interviews, 
with the exception of medical emergency assistance, is made to Turkish subsidiaries of 
foreign service companies (consulting agencies, market survey institutes and such). In the 
interview, two particular activities were discussed. The Human Resources Department had 
recently undergone an organisational structure change. The actual reorganizing had been 
performed by the Turkish subsidiary, trying to accommodate it to the organisational model 
required by the mother company. Secondly, a web service for recruitment purposes had 
recently been developed. The actual implementation had been outsourced to a Turkish 
subsidiary of a large foreign agency, based on the requirements and system structure 
developed by the mother company. 
 
                                                 
54 The Turkish company, on the other hand, hold Turkey, Europe and the Middle East as the main locations for 
their suppliers. The quantitative distribution among these three regions is however unknown. 
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4.5 Flow of Knowledge Resources to and from the Mother Company 
 
One particular area was discussed in the interviews that do not fit very well with the above 
categorizations. This seemed quite important, and deserves some particular attention. As part 
of a global company, there is some level of human capital flow between company 
subsidiaries and between subsidiaries and the main office. 
According to the human resources interviewee, Turkish workers are exchanged to 
the global company for periods of time, most commonly ranging from three to five years. 
There are also some exchanges made when particular competencies are needed on an ongoing 
project; this seemed however to be rather unidirectional, with foreign (management or 
technical) experts being hired to Turkish projects. The probability of employees with 
technical backgrounds and work assignments having international careers is comparably 
(with supportive functions) quite high. 
The interviewee from market and sales had the impression that most of these 
employees, when returning to the Turkish subsidiary, were given quite substantial promotions 
(often to middle management position). However, according to the human resources 
interviewee, this does not always happen. Quite often, the returning employee has reached a 
level of specialisation high enough to render her/him somewhat overly qualified for the 
Turkish subsidiary. This would result in one of three possible career paths being taken. 
Firstly, the employee will return to the global company, taking on a technical position in 
another country, often being the main office home country. Secondly, the employee will be 
assigned a position as a technical manager. Such positions offer a higher level of aggregate 
responsibility, with the responsibility areas being, compared to the position held prior to the 
global exchange, skewed to an administrative rather than technological domain. Finally, the 
employee may be assigned to her/his old technological position. 
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C H A P T E R   5 
A N A L Y S I S 
 
The empirical investigations done in this thesis, as presented in Chapter 4, clearly indicates 
that the foreign company maintains a drastically low level of interaction with the Turkish 
national system of innovation. Compared with the initial information obtained from a 
comparable Turkish company, the interaction loops running from the foreign company is 
virtually non-existent; and when present they are mostly of a quantitative quality. The frame 
of analysis in this thesis was chosen to be the national system of innovation. However, the 
empirical findings clearly indicate that this particular multinational company transcends such 
borders. The majority of cooperation partners for the company in question is placed outside 
this national boundary, and it seems no consideration are made in relation to cultural 
proximity in terms of the further educating of employees, choices of trade partners, or in 
product development. Whether this indicates a weakness in the NSI approach to innovation 
and economic growth when faced with multinational enterprises or a weakness in the strategy 
of the multinational company is outside the scope of this paper. Hence, it will not be 
discussed further here, and the forthcoming discussion will be performed in the theoretical 
light already established. Furthermore, the discussion will be performed as if the company 
researched is representative for its particular category of firms. This chapter will thus take a 
closer look at the possible effects the lack of interaction might have on the Turkish 
development of technological capabilities. 
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5.1 Horizontal Cooperation 
 
Quite a substantial proportion of the functionalities intended to be covered by the category 
‘horizontal cooperation’ is of course rendered impossible due to the missing research and 
development facilities of the company. Without such facilities, there are no possibilities for 
joint technological development efforts with neither competitors nor national knowledge 
producers; neither does it allow for any voluntary sharing of or involuntary spilling of 
research results that could have had a positive impact on the capabilities in the Turkish 
system of innovation. 
The only options for involuntary and/or voluntary horizontal cooperation are thus 
related to employee training and employee’s pre- and post-company careers. Formal training 
of employees is, as I have described, partially performed in Turkey and partially abroad. The 
training performed in Turkey is, however, on a comparably low level of specialisation. It 
seems safe to assume that the employees receiving and utilizing the possibility of further 
training can be placed in the category of employees with long careers in the company. The 
average turn-over rate was estimated to be as low as eight years; however, as this includes 
employees being laid-off and newly recruited people quitting within the two year mark of 
employment, the turn-over rate relevant to this thesis is indeed lower. This would imply that 
an employee that recently has received training in the Turkish subsidiary rarely enters the 
system of innovation by means of changing employer. Low turn-over rates as in this case 
would mean that the transfer of (especially tacit) knowledge carried by trained personal is 
very low. Combined with the fact that training is performed in-house, without the assistance 
of any external Turkish agents, the organisational knowledge is tried to be maintained 
securely within the company. 
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As for employees receiving foreign training, which is on a higher level of 
specialisation, two main pitfalls were discovered. Firstly, the chance of ‘brain-drain’ seems to 
be quite high. After providing the foreign training, the company in a number of cases has 
problems finding positions where the employee fully can utilize the newly acquired 
competencies. Working in a company with a global internal work market, there is thus a high 
risk for the employee finding more challenging positions elsewhere within the same 
conglomerate and thus being in some sense lost from the Turkish system. Secondly, even 
when avoiding the emigration of the employee, the position given to her/him on return will 
quite frequently under-utilize the technical competencies held by the employee. The effects 
of employee training spread out to the Turkish system of innovation are thus almost 
negligible. 
Regarding the interaction with the education system for developing future 
employees, the company holds a central position due to the high number of trainee- and 
internships offered to Turkish students. However, the work assignments in these internships 
and the rationale for offering them severely reduce the possible effects on the Turkish system 
of innovation. The low amount of advanced technological and organisational tasks performed 
by the company is reflected in its employment strategies towards students from Turkish 
universities and lower level educational institutions. The majority (actually as much as 99%) 
of the internships are offered with rationale other than the competency level of the students. 
Customer and employee relationships (in addition the obvious compliance to Turkish legal 
issues) are a much stronger incentive for employing students. This reflects the fact that the 
Turkish subsidiary largely works as a sales agency, rather than a technological agency in the 
international conglomerate. The high number of internships offered for these (to name them 
crudely) non-productive reasons lead the work assignments to being of very low level and in 
no way in vital functions. Given that a very low percentage of the interns actually spend their 
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forthcoming careers in the company could have led to large spillover effects by having 
company trained students working for other companies in the Turkish system of innovation. 
However, with the low level of work assignments, the competencies and knowledge obtained 
by these students are of such a nature that they are of negligible importance in their future 
career. Again, I must conclude that in terms of developing basic qualities in future employees 
the effects of this foreign company are rather non-existent. 
This conclusion is further established by the fact that the company offers virtually 
no advisory services to students on career paths to follow or courses that are of special 
commercial interest, and that no services are offered to Turkish universities in terms of guest 
lecturers or development of courses in order to fit more closely with the needs of the 
corporate sphere. This may have the effect that the problem solving skills developed by 
graduate students are to some extent not compliant to the problem solving skills needed by 
the industry. 
 
5.2 Vertical Linkages 
 
Vertical linkages were included in this thesis to capture the user-producer relationships that 
initiated the term of a national system of innovation. Fruitful connections between seller and 
buyer require the flow of qualitative information in order to stimulate and develop innovative 
capabilities on both sides of the relationship; the empirical findings show that no such 
information flows from Turkish customers to the company. The need for such information is 
of course severely diminished by the fact that the company has no research and development 
facilities in Turkey. It is further cemented by the comparably negligible proportion made up 
by the Turkish end market in the company’s aggregate global sales. Without customer 
feedback having a possible role in the development of technologies there is obviously no 
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apparent need for a long term strategy concerning such communication. This lack of 
communication may have two detrimental effects on the aggregate capabilities present in the 
Turkish system of innovation. Firstly, customers that are not conferred with in developing 
new technologies or adapting existing technologies to new user situations will not experience 
a growth in their ‘customer competence’. The customers will of course not fill the position of 
a demanding customer towards this particular company (as no such function is allowed due to 
the lack of communication channels), but additionally, imagining the system as a chained 
user-producer network, this may also have a negative effect on the level of functionality 
demanded from other Turkish companies. Secondly, the company will offer no technologies 
that are specifically designed to Turkish user situations. This may lead to technologies and 
products performing at a sub-optimal level when faced with specific Turkish needs. This 
weakness may of course be lessened if the company is faced with direct domestic competition 
(where a Turkish company will offer technologies more adapted to needs in its home market); 
however, this is not the case for the company in this study. If other Turkish companies are not 
challenged by ever growing needs of their domestic customers or the components used in 
their products are sub-optimal, these effects may of course have a negative effect on, among 
other things, the export competitiveness of the Turkish industry. 
When asking questions on the relationship between the company and Turkish 
suppliers the answers were surprisingly straight forward; no Turkish suppliers are currently 
employed by the company. The suggestion from the theoretical discussion that FDI 
companies often prefer to maintain ties with the suppliers of the mother company was to 
some extent confirmed by the fact that an overwhelming majority of components were 
bought from other foreign subsidiaries of the same global company. The reasons for why no 
Turkish suppliers had been chosen are unclear. The choice of a (external) supplier was made 
based on technological monitoring of potential suppliers, which would indicate that the 
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technological levels of Turkish candidates are perceived to be too low compared with foreign 
suppliers. The company will obviously act as a geographically neutral buyer in the market 
place; one can not expect that a customer (apart maybe from governmental customers) makes 
idealistic decisions based on the development of a country’s technological capabilities. 
Turkish suppliers will in this sense miss out on a financially promising (as a foothold with the 
Turkish subsidiary may work as a boot strap for international supplier contracts) and 
technologically demanding (provided that the assumption of FDI companies as 
technologically resourceful companies holds) customer. This may again, as in the previous 
case with customer interaction, have negative effects on the international competitiveness of 
the Turkish industry. 
The IDP approach classifies stages 1 and 2 (Table 2.3) as developing countries 
(which corresponds to the more naïve classification of Turkey based on GDP/capita). Stages 
1/2 assume the R&D effort of a foreign multinational in a host country to be “adaptation of 
product and process” (corresponding to Bartlett and Ghoshal’s (1990) central-for-global 
international innovation management strategy). This fits very well with the activities 
performed by the researched company (no research and development on a basic technological 
level, but offering projecting services to accommodate the technology to large customers). 
Quite a large fraction of the unexploited potential for interaction can, in my opinion, be 
traced to the lacking research and development division. Based on the theoretical 
presentations made in this thesis this renders a number of network spillovers impossible or, 
for the company, strategically unsound. The lack of such a division transforms the Turkish 
subsidiary into a sales, rather than technology, agency. This will in turn lead to a lessened 
need for qualitative network communication channels intended to increase the innovativeness 
of the company. It may also give the company a lower need for technological competence 
which, as described, may lead to highly specialised employees taking on more demanding 
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projects in other countries or under-utilizing their competencies in Turkey. A lot of the 
weaknesses discovered in this thesis can thus seemingly be traced to this lacking division in 
the researched company; it rules out horizontal cooperation of an influential degree, it renders 
long term strategies for qualitative customer communication somewhat strategically 
unnecessary, and it may also in fact reduce the technological work content for the company’s 
employees.  
When combining theories on national systems of innovation with the technology 
gap approach, the technological capabilities (or absorptive capacity) residing in an innovation 
system partly originates from the interactive learning spaces described by Arocena and Sutz 
(2003). Given the conduct of this particular multinational company and its subsidiary it seems 
that few (or none) learning spaces are created between this company and the Turkish system 
of innovation. Following Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) it thus seems that little organizational 
knowledge (neither problem solving nor learning capacity) is created and exchanged, as this 
strongly relies on the processes of socialization and externalization; which obviously require 
such learning spaces. Paradoxically, due to its sheer size, the company is a large actor in the 
Turkish economy, but a very weak actor in the innovation system. This company to a large 
extent internalises its knowledge, and the exploited potential for knowledge spillovers 
through network linkages is very low. 
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C H A P T E R   6 
P O L I C Y   I M P L I C A T I O N S  A N D   F U T U R E   R E S E A R C H   I S S U E S  
 
6.1 Policy Implications 
 
The discussion in chapter 2.6 on policies claimed that there are two groups of policy actions 
related to foreign direct investments; one to attract investments to the country and one to 
exploit investments already made in the country. Figure 3.5 clearly states that the inflow of 
foreign investments to Turkey is substantially lower than in a number of comparable 
countries, despite her geographical and demographical advantages. The previous analysis in 
Chapter 5 shows that there is a large unexploited potential for development of technological 
capabilities and knowledge spill-overs resulting from investments (given that the company 
investigated is relatively representative for its category). Thus, both groups of FDI policies 
should be viable candidates for further discussions. However, this paper will concentrate on 
the latter, assuming that the underlying mechanisms are interrelated. This seems a safe 
assumption to make, as both the investment attractiveness and the interaction attractiveness 
rely on an established system of innovation that offer the investor a desired level of 
capabilities and complementarities. Chapter 2.6 showed that, in addition to improving the 
domestic innovation system, direct policy measures for improving type I spillovers do exist. 
These are however not as desirable as a more fundamental improvement of capabilities, as a 
large proportion of them are prohibited by international agreements and too extensive 
investment requirements may seem unappealing to potential investors. Neither is there in 
Turkey any established practices for imposing such investment requirements. 
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The number of possible reasons for the lack of interaction discovered in this paper is 
of course extremely high and on different level of detail. Finding the exact reasons would 
pose a tremendously challenging research task, and it is doubtful whether the results would 
be very interesting as they would probably significantly differ from company to company. 
But, in order for interactions to occur the foreign company clearly has to be willing and able 
to interact. ‘Willing’ implies that financial or strategic incentives for interacting with the local 
innovation system exists, while ‘able’ presupposes that the existing innovation system offer 
the complementarities needed by the company on the quality level demanded. Thus, the lack 
of interaction can occur when a company is either55 
• Willing, but unable: The company wishes to interact with local companies as this 
would present financial or strategic gains, but is not able to due to the low 
compatibility of the national system of innovation and the comparably low level 
of technological and organizational capabilities in the country’s economic agents. 
• Able, but unwilling: The surrounding system of innovation is qualitatively and 
quantitatively sufficient to offer the services demanded by the foreign company, 
but the lack of incentives or imposed global restrictions (from the mother division) 
lead the company to interact outside the national borders. 
 
It would be futile, not to mention enormously overly ambitious, within the frames of this 
thesis to make specific suggestions for policies that could or should be chosen by the Turkish 
authorities to amend weaknesses discovered here. However, it is my opinion that policies 
should be chosen to enable unable and motivate unwilling companies. Obviously, there are 
large amounts of political work that needs to be done in order to amend the, to say the least, 
not optimal Turkish macroeconomic climate; especially to lower the levels of inflation and to 
                                                 
55 These are obviously extremes; most companies will be somewhere between these two situations. However, 
for analytical purposes, black-and-white situations are more easily grasped. 
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improve the international reputation of Turkish control of corruption and political stability. 
This is however outside the scope of this paper. 
There is contradictory evidence whether foreign companies are able to interact with 
Turkish companies. Theoretically, a classification of Turkey as a stage 1/2 country in the IDP 
approach assumes a medium to low level of absorptive capacity, which in turn would indicate 
a low level of technological capabilities. The low productivity in central sectors of the 
economy (seemingly due to the use of outranged technologies in a large informal economy), 
the low work force participation of educated women, and the high export content of labour 
intensive products (manufactured exports, see Figure 3.2) would confirm this. The fact that 
the investigated company performs technology monitoring of potential Turkish suppliers 
without actually choosing them gives even further indications. However, the Turkish work 
force is relatively well educated (Figure 3.2), the university environments are active 
researchers (Table 3.2), and there is a modern part of the industry sectors that performs on a 
satisfactory productivity level. However, if companies’ being unable is the case, possible 
policy measures could be 
• Improve basic education 
• Increase the amount of industry participation in university education to make sure 
that problem solving skills are developed in accordance with industry needs 
• Stimulate research and development efforts in domestic companies 
 
There is less evidence to indicate whether companies are willing to interact with Turkish 
companies. Such information was naturally not easily retrieved in the interviews, and there is 
little theoretical or macro economical statistics that could give indications. An unfavourable 
macroeconomic climate would quite possibly render companies unwilling to cooperate with 
local companies. This is clearly the case in Turkey with high levels of inflation, and low 
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ratings on control of corruption and political stability, but, as previously mentioned, policy 
measures for this are not going to be further discussed here. If companies’ being unwilling is 
the case, possible policy measures could be 
• Government procurement which would leave non-cooperating companies missing 
large contracts 
• Financial stimulation of intra- and inter-industry cooperation 
 
This paper will not go any further in the discussions on policy measures and their effects; I 
will however pose some questions in the next chapter on future research issues. 
 
6.2 Future Research Issues 
 
• The validity of the NSI approach when faced with multinational companies 
In the analysis part of this thesis I mentioned briefly that the NSI approach may fail 
to describe the interactive conduct of multinational companies. These companies may 
transcend cultural and geographical borders and ignore being hampered by institutional 
differences. Research could be made to validate or deny the viability of the approach when 
faced with highly vertically integrated multinational companies. 
 
• The importance of FDI companies establishing R&D facilities in the host country 
A central point in the analysis in this thesis was that a large proportion of the 
potential spill-over effects from FDI companies rely on the presence of an R&D facility in 
the host country. Research could be made to compare FDI companies with such facilities 
with companies without and investigate the effects on network interactions with and spill-
overs to the host system of innovation. 
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• The performance of FDI industry clusters 
This thesis has made the theoretical deduction that collaborating with multinationals 
are beneficial to the development of absorptive capacity and technological capabilities in the 
collaboratee. Empirical investigations should be made to confirm or deny this to be the case. 
Research could be made comparing clusters with FDI companied with clusters without on a 
number of performance parameters (e.g. export competitiveness, innovation capabilities, or 
market shares). 
 
• The importance of industry participation in shaping university curricula 
Several theorists claim (as do I) that one of the main tasks of the (higher) education 
system is to develop problem solving skills adapted to the needs of the industry. Research 
could be made to investigate whether the participation of industry agents in shaping the 
education (through for instance career guidance or provision of guest lecturers) leads to 
problem solving skills being more closely fitted to ‘real life’ needs. 
 
• The effect of locally dependent economic parameters on the behaviour of FDI companies 
In an economy with high presence of locally dependent economic parameters (e.g. 
corruption, political stability, informal economies, ‘clan economies’) it is plausible to believe 
that local companies with locally adapted behaviour and business ethics would perform better 
than foreign companies compared to economies with a low presence of such parameters. This 
research could investigate whether such an economic climate affects the behaviour of foreign 
companies, especially when choosing collaboration partners. 
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